In November 2004, the German Honeynet Project deployed a classic GenII honeynet with a Redhat Linux 7.3 honeypot. Although this is a relatively old operating system release and an easy target for attackers, it surprisingly took around 2.5 months before the honeypot was successfully compromised - a marked contrast with the relatively quick compromise of the honeypots discussed in the incidents above. More information on this trend can be found in a previous KYE white paper "Know your Enemy: Trends".
On January 11th 2005, an attacker did successfully compromise the honeypot, using an exploit for the OpenSSL SSLv2 Malformed Client Key Remote Buffer Overflow Vulnerability present in the default Redhat Linux 7.3 distribution. This incident was unusual in that once the attacker had gained access to the compromised system, no phishing content was uploaded directly. Instead, the attacker installed and configured a port redirection service on the honeypot.
This port redirection service was designed to re-route HTTP requests sent to the honeypot web server to another remote web server in a transparent manner, potentially making the location of the content source harder to trace. The attacker downloaded and installed a tool called redir on the honeypot, which was a port redirector utility designed to transparently forward incoming TCP connections to a remote destination host. In this incident the attacker configured the tool to redirect all incoming traffic on TCP port 80 (HTTP) of the honeypot to TCP Port 80 (HTTP) on a remote web server in China. Interestingly, the attacker did not bother to install a rootkit to hide their presence on the honeypot, which suggests that the attacker did not value the compromised server too highly and that they were not particularly worried about being detected.
The command used by the attacker to establish port redirection was:
redir --lport=80 --laddr=<IP address of honeypot> --cport=80 --caddr=221.4.XXX.XXX
In addition, the attacker modified the Linux system start up file /etc/rc.d/rc.local to ensure that the redir port redirector service would be restarted if the honeypot system was rebooted, improving the chance of survival for their port redirection service. They then began to send out spam phishing emails which advertised the honeypot, an example of which can be found here (note that relevant sensitive information has been obfuscated).
To further investigate the activities for the phisher, members of the German Honeynet Project intervened and covertly modified the configuration of the attacker's redir tool installed on the honeypot, enabling logging within the redir application itself, to more easily observe how many people received a spam email advertising the honeypot and then clicked on a hyperlink to access the transparently redirected phishing content. Within a period of about 36 hours, 721 unique IP addresses were redirected, and once again we were surprised by how many users were apparently being tricked into accessing such content through phishing emails. An analysis of the IP addresses accessing the port redirector honeypot can be found here (note that this information has been sanitized to protect the users who accessed the phishing content, and again only IP data was logged during this research. No confidential user data was captured).
A summary timeline of the incident is provided below:
|Date / Time||Event|
|1st Nov 2004||First network probe data of honeypot|
|11th Jan 2005 - 19:13||Honeypot OpenSSL service compromised, port redirector installed and phishing spam sent|
|11th Jan 2005 - 20:07||Web requests for phishing content begins to arrive at honeypot|
|13th Jan 2005 - 8:15||Honeypot taken offline for forensic analysis|